Ukrainian refinery strikes see Russia’s oil product exports hit record lows and Moscow turn to importing fuels from South Korea and India

Authors: Luke Wickenden and Isaac Levi; Data scientist: Panda Rushwood

Key findings

In August 2026, Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues fell by 8% month-on-month to EUR 604 mn per day, while export volumes fell 7%.
Russia’s seaborne crude oil export revenues fell 13%. Ukrainian drone attacks disrupted the Sheskharis terminal, cutting loadings at Novorossiysk by 58% month-on-month. Loadings at the Novorossiysk port ceased for nine consecutive days, the longest disruption since Russia’s full-scale invasion began.
Revenue from seaborne oil product exports unloaded at their destination ports fell sharply by 32% month-on-month to EUR 78 mn per day, the lowest level since Russia’s full-scale invasion.
Tuapse — Russia’s fourth-largest oil product export port before the full-scale invasion — which has faced sustained drone attacks since May, did not load a single cargo of oil products for the third consecutive month.
Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s refining capacity have turned tables on the world’s once largest oil product exporter to see them start importing fuels, with imports surging to a record 172,000 tonnes in August — more than seven times the previous monthly high. Russia was forced to import fuel from South Korea and buy back gasoline refined from its own crude in India.
EU imports of Russian LNG fell 46% month-on-month to their lowest monthly volume since Russia’s full-scale invasion began.
China was the largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels in August, with seaborne crude imports up 16% month-on-month and 62% above August 2025 levels.
Despite the EU’s ban on oil products made from Russian crude, 20 shipments from refineries processing Russian crude were unloaded at EU ports in August — 2 more than the previous month’s total.
Refineries in India, Turkiye, Brunei, and Georgia that use Russian crude exported EUR 510 mn of oil products to sanctioning countries in August 2026.
In August 2026, 52% of Russia’s seaborne oil was transported by sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers. A further 42% of the volume was transported by G7+ owned or insured tankers. The remainder was transported by non-sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers.
In August, nine new vessels entered the Russian oil trade; four of these tankers were owned or insured by the G7+ at the time of loading.
45 ‘shadow’ vessels transporting Russian fossil fuels were operating under false flags at the end of August 2026.
The Hormuz energy crisis boosted Russia’s seaborne oil and gas export revenues by an estimated EUR 31 bn in the six months following the US–Israel strikes on Iran due to inflated energy prices.

Trends in total export revenues

In August 2026, Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues fell by 8% month-on-month to EUR 604 mn per day, while export volumes fell by 7%.
Russia’s crude oil export revenues fell 9% month-on-month to EUR 350 mn per day, and volumes dropped 11%. Pipeline crude oil export earnings were 14% higher than the previous month, whilst seaborne crude export revenues fell 13%.
Revenue from seaborne oil product exports unloaded at their destination ports fell sharply by 32% month-on-month to EUR 78 mn per day, the lowest level since Russia’s full-scale invasion, while export volumes fell 21%.
Oil product loadings at Russian ports have now fallen for three consecutive months. In August 2026, oil product loaded volumes were less than half the levels observed in August 2025. Tuapse — Russia’s fourth-largest oil product export port before the full-scale invasion — which has faced sustained drone attacks since May, did not load a single cargo of oil products for the third consecutive month. With refinery throughput still depressed and domestic demand taking priority (jet fuel, diesel, and gasoline are still under an export ban), the continued slide in loadings points to another fall in oil product revenues in September.
Ukrainian drone attacks in mid-August disrupted operations at Russia’s Black Sea Sheskharis terminal at the port of Novorossiysk, contributing to crude oil loadings falling by 58% month-on-month compared with July. Crude oil loadings at the port of Novorossiysk ceased for nine consecutive days — the longest period without reported loadings since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) export revenues from unloaded cargoes rose by 18% to EUR 45 mn per day, while volumes rose 10% month-on-month. Loaded Russian LNG volumes also increased 9% month-on-month.
Pipeline gas export revenues rose by 25% to EUR 68 mn per day, while export volumes rose 5% month-on-month.
Russia’s coal export revenues fell by 6% month-on-month to EUR 62 mn per day.

Who is buying Russia’s fossil fuels?

Russia’s fossil fuel exports remain highly concentrated, with China dominating purchases of coal and crude oil, Turkiye leading purchases of oil products, and the EU remaining the largest buyer of LNG and pipeline gas — showing Moscow’s dependence on a narrow set of key customers.
Coal: From 5 December 2022 until the end of August 2026, China purchased 37% of all Russian coal exports. India (19%), Turkiye (15%), South Korea (12%), and Vietnam (4%) round out the top five buyers’ list.
Crude oil: China has bought 50% of Russia’s crude exports, followed by India (37%), Turkiye (5%), and the EU (5%).
Oil products: Turkiye, the largest buyer, has purchased 26% of Russia’s oil product exports, followed by China (12%), Brazil (11%), Singapore (8%), and Saudi Arabia (8%).
LNG: The EU remains the largest buyer of Russian LNG, accounting for almost half (49%) of Russia’s total LNG exports, followed by China (24%), Japan (18%), and South Korea (6%).
Pipeline gas: The EU is the largest buyer, purchasing 32% of Russia’s pipeline gas exports, followed by China (31%), and Turkiye (29%).

In August 2026, China remained the largest global buyer of Russian fossil fuels, accounting for 51% (EUR 8.4 bn) of Russia’s export revenues from the top five importers. Crude oil accounted for 70% (EUR 5.8 bn) of China’s purchases, followed by pipeline gas (EUR 777 mn), LNG (EUR 682 mn), coal (682 mn), and oil products (EUR 411 mn).
China’s unloadings of Russian seaborne crude rose by 16% month-on-month and were 62% higher than in August 2025. Russia’s share of China’s seaborne crude oil imports rose to 23%, up from 9% in August 2025. While East Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) grade crude continued to account for the majority of the Russian crude unloaded at Chinese ports (62%) in August, unloadings of Sokol-grade crude, which loads at the Russian Pacific Sea port of De Kastri, increased by 151% month-on-month.
In August 2026, Shandong Yulong Petrochemical Ltd — sanctioned by the EU and UK — drove much of the increase in China’s seaborne imports of Russian crude, with its imports rising by 141% month-on-month, as well as imports at the port of Yantai, which rose 83%.
India was the second-largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels in August 2026, importing a total of EUR 4.8 bn of Russian hydrocarbons. Crude oil constituted 87% of India’s purchases, totalling EUR 4.1 bn. Coal (EUR 379 mn) and oil products (EUR 258 mn) constituted the remainder of their monthly Russian imports.
After two consecutive months of record-high crude oil imports from Russia, India’s imports decreased by 24% in August month-on-month. Imports by all three of India’s largest Russian crude-importing refineries remained high in August: the Jamnagar refinery (fell 15% month-on-month), Vadinar refinery (rose 5%), and Paradip refinery (increased a minor 1%). The IndianOil Vadinar SMPL installation imported a significantly lower quantity of Russian crude oil in August, down 48% from the prior month. Meanwhile, imports of Russian crude at smaller refineries, such as HMEL Mundra Oil Terminal, decreased by 34% month-on-month.
Turkiye was the third-largest importer, purchasing EUR 1.5 bn of Russian hydrocarbons in August. Pipeline gas accounted for the largest share at 34% (EUR 493 mn), followed by crude oil (EUR 467 mn), oil products (EUR 353 mn), and finally coal (EUR 155 mn).
Turkiye’s import volume of Russian oil products decreased by 37% in August — unloading the lowest monthly quantity of Russian refined fuels since mid-2022. Meanwhile, the value of its Russian pipeline gas imports continued to overtake crude and oil products as the largest component of Turkiye’s purchases from Russia.
The EU was the fourth-largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels, accounting for just under 8% (EUR 1.2 bn) of Russia’s export revenues from the top five importers in August.
The EU saw a sharp 46% month-on-month decrease in Russian LNG import volumes. This left EU imports of Russian LNG at a record low, the lowest unloaded monthly volumes since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Almost half (57%) of the EU’s Russian LNG imports were unloaded at French ports. Volumes decreased to this record low four full months after the EU’s ban on short-term Russian LNG supply contracts took effect on 25 April 2026. Under the REPowerEU regulation, Russian LNG imports remain permissible if the underlying short-term supply contracts were concluded before 17 June 2025, so strict enforcement and transparency remain necessary to ensure the ban is not undermined by imports under legacy contracts.
Pipeline gas made up 61% of the EU’s imports (EUR 756 mn) and LNG 26% (EUR 323 mn). The remaining 13% consisted of crude oil transported through the Druzhba pipeline to Slovakia.
Egypt was the fifth-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels in August. Despite a 29% month-on-month decrease in unloaded volumes, the country purchased EUR 513 mn, which consisted of crude and oil products. Sixteen percent of imports into Egypt went to the Ain Sukhna installation, which has not consistently imported from Russia for over a year — all unloaded imports were High Sulfur Fuel Oil (HSFO).

In August 2026, the five largest EU importers of Russian fossil fuels paid Russia a combined EUR 1.1 bn. Natural gas (pipeline and LNG) — partially sanctioned by the EU — accounted for 85% of the value of imports from the five largest buyers. The five largest EU importers purchased EUR 933 mn of Russian natural gas, comprising EUR 659 mn of pipeline gas, EUR 273 mn of LNG, and EUR 167 mn of crude oil via the Druzhba pipeline.
In August, the EU unloaded its lowest monthly volume of Russian LNG since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine — 46% lower month-on-month.
In August, Hungary was the EU’s largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels, importing EUR 386 mn entirely in pipeline gas.
Slovakia remained the EU’s second-largest importer in August, importing almost equal parts crude oil and pipeline gas.
France was the third-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels, purchasing EUR 190 mn worth of LNG. Despite this, the volume of French LNG imports from Russia remained unchanged month-on-month, with four cargoes being unloaded from the Yamal installation. France’s total LNG imports from all countries rose by 56% in August compared to the previous month.
Bulgaria rose to become the fourth-highest importer of Russian fossil fuels, importing exclusively pipeline gas through the Balkan Stream pipeline.
Spain’s import volume of Russian LNG also remained stable in August compared to the previous month, despite a marginal increase in value to EUR 84 mn, with only one cargo unloaded at each of the ports of Bilbao and Barcelona. The total volume of unloaded LNG at Spanish ports rose 45% in August month-on-month.

Facing fuel shortages, Russia imports products refined from its own crude in India and receives fuel from South Korea

Russia typically imports only small volumes of refined oil products, averaging less than 5 thousand tonnes per month of seaborne imports between 2023 and 2025. No cargoes of imported fuels were unloaded at Russian ports for 13 of those 36 months. Most of Russia’s oil product imports from Ukraine’s allies consisted of gasoil and clean products from South Korea, supplying Pacific ports that are difficult to reach by other routes. After repeated waves of Ukrainian drone strikes targeting Russia’s energy and refining infrastructure, Russia has for a while been facing severe domestic fuel shortages.

In a desperate effort to ease domestic fuel shortages, Russia has begun importing significant volumes of oil products refined abroad, some of which are produced from Russian crude. In August 2026, it imported 172 thousand tonnes of oil products (valued at EUR 114 mn). Russia’s import volumes in August 2026 were more than seven times the previous monthly high that was recorded since the full-scale invasion and three times the total import volume for the whole of 2025. Gasoline accounted for 74% of Russia’s total oil product imports in August, compared with just 6% between 2023 and 2025. This made Russia a net exporter of gasoline in August 2026. India supplied 70% of Russia’s oil product imports (94% of its gasoline imports) in August, 120 thousand tonnes of gasoline (EUR 78 mn), all of it loaded at the Vadinar refinery and sold by EU-sanctioned Nayara Energy and bought by Rosneft. Rosneft holds 49.13% of Nayara Energy, and Vadinar took 100% of its crude from Russia in the first eight months of 2026, up from 81% across 2025. Russia is therefore paying a refinery that it partly owns to process its own crude into fuel it can no longer produce domestically, before shipping it back halfway around the world. Each cargo exported from India’s Vadinar refinery to Russia was transferred between vessels in a ship-to-ship operation at the Damietta Lightering Zone off Egypt before unloading at Russia’s Arctic port of Beloe More. Every one of these cargoes moved on a sanctioned tanker, and four of the six vessels involved had flown a false flag at some point in the past two years.Egypt also exported 25 thousand tonnes of diesel, valued at EUR 16 mn, from the Egyptian port of El Dekheila, which was unloaded at the Russian port of St Petersburg.South Korea typically exports a small but steady supply of clean products, gasoil and fuel oil from its port of Ulsan to Russia’s Pacific ports such as Magadan and Mokhovaya. However, in July and August 2026, it exported the largest volumes since the full-scale invasion began, in back-to-back months. In August 2026, Russia imported 18 thousand tonnes of South Korean oil products, mostly gasoil — 41% above the previous post-invasion monthly record set in July and eight times the three-year monthly average.While it falls outside the focus of this August analysis, Turkiye also appears to have started shipping gasoline to Russia, with the first cargoes arriving in September 2026. Three cargoes totalling 98 thousand tonnes (EUR 68 mn) left storage terminals at Mersin during August, and two of them have now completed unloading at Russian ports, one of which was bought by Lukoil.In terms of magnitude, the import volume of Russian oil products is not colossal. However, Russia, formerly the world’s largest oil-product exporter, now faces additional logistical costs and higher prices to import products that it previously produced domestically. Freight from western India to the White Sea, ship-to-ship transfers off Egypt and the insurance costs are all expenses it would not carry at all if its own refineries were running. In recent months, Russia’s need to buy gasoline from a refinery it partly owns in India and ship it halfway around the world using the same fleet that carries its exports has demonstrated the impact of Ukrainian drone strikes on its domestic refining capacity.

Despite the EU’s ban on imports of oil products made from Russian crude, which came into force on 21 January 2026, twenty shipments of oil products from refineries using Russian crude — identified as high risk according to EU guidance — were unloaded at EU ports in August. This was an increase from eighteen shipments in July.
Nine of these shipments departed from Turkiye’s refineries, while seven departed from Indian refineries and another four from Georgia.
In August, Italy and Cyprus were the largest recipients, each unloading five shipments from refineries that processed Russian crude alongside crude from other origins. Romania received three shipments, France and Spain received two each, and Greece, the Netherlands and Ireland received one each.
Enforcement agencies in Member States must investigate shipments of oil products imported from refineries processing Russian crude to prevent Russian oil molecules from entering the bloc, which would violate the EU’s recently implemented ban.
Refineries in India, Turkiye, Brunei, and Georgia that use Russian crude exported EUR 510 mn of oil products to sanctioning countries in August 2026. The importers included the EU (EUR 333 mn), the US (EUR 143 mn), and Australia (EUR 34 mn). An estimated EUR 189 mn of these products were refined from Russian crude.
There was a 29% month-on-month decrease in exports of oil products from these refineries reported as destined for ports in sanctioning countries.
Exports of oil products reported as destined for Australia from refineries running on Russian crude dropped 81% in value terms month-on-month, while those headed to the US dropped 35% month-on-month. Export value of oil products from these refineries headed to EU ports rose 22% month-on-month in August.
In August 2026, the UK unloaded its second shipment of oil products from a refinery processing Russian crude since the UK Government introduced an exemption on 20 May 2026. The exemption permits imports of diesel and jet fuel refined from Russian crude until the licence expires on 1 January 2027. The shipment comprised 64,000 tonnes of jet fuel valued at EUR 48 mn, which departed from India’s Jamnagar refinery and was unloaded at the UK’s Isle of Grain terminal.
Exports to the US originated solely at the Jamnagar refinery in India in August. In the prior three months, 38% of the Jamnagar refinery’s feedstock came from Russia.
The Kulevi refinery in Georgia continues to run solely on Russian crude and has not received a single shipment of non-Russian crude since opening in October 2025, while also exporting refined products to the EU after the ban took effect. The EU’s 21st sanctions package introduces a transaction ban on Georgia’s Kulevi refinery for processing and trading Russian oil, which will take effect after a six-month wind-down period. The Georgian port of Kulevi has stated that it will no longer accept Russian oil as of August or September this year. However, 100% of the Kulevi port’s crude oil imports in August came from Russia. CREA’s recently published analysis highlights how Kulevi and Batumi appear to be exporting oil products suspected of containing Russian molecules to sanctioning jurisdictions.

How are oil prices changing?

In August 2026, the average price of Russia’s Urals-grade crude rose by 23% month-on-month to USD 69.9 per barrel, significantly higher than the EU and UK price cap of USD 44.1 per barrel, which took effect on 1 February 2026 and has been capped at the same level under the EU’s 21st sanctions package.
Global fossil fuel prices remained high in August, as detected crossings by vessels transporting oil through the Strait of Hormuz remained significantly below levels pre-dating US-Israel’s strikes on Iran and dropped 22% in August month-on-month.
The Hormuz energy crisis has delivered a substantial boost to Russia’s fossil fuel export earnings. CREA’s recent analysis estimates that, in the six months since the US–Israel strikes on Iran began, higher oil and gas prices have increased Russia’s seaborne export revenues by an estimated USD 35.9 bn (equivalent to EUR 31 bn).

In August, the price discount on Urals-grade crude oil relative to the global benchmark Brent remained at 24%, or USD 22 per barrel, similar to the previous month’s level.

Sanctioned tankers carry the majority of Russian crude despite G7+ sanctions

In August 2026, 52% of Russia’s seaborne oil was transported by sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers. A further 42% of the volume was transported by G7+ tankers. The remainder was transported by non-sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers.
G7+ tankers transported 34% of Russian crude oil exports in August, while non-sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers accounted for 5% of the total. The largest share, 61%, was carried by sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers.
For oil products, Russia’s dependence on G7+ tankers is higher; these tankers transported 72% of Russian oil products in August. Sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers carried 19% of total Russian oil product volumes, while non-sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers accounted for 9% of the volume.

In August 2026, nine new vessels entered the Russian oil trade, none of which had previously loaded Russian oil at any point since the start of our analysis period in 2020. This total is below the average (roughly 12 new vessels per month) over the past 12 months. Four of those nine newly Russia-serving vessels were owned or insured by the G7+ at the time of loading.
Newly Russia-serving ‘shadow’ fleet vessels (with no ownership or insurance registered in sanctioning countries) have remained low throughout 2026, never exceeding three in a month, but June, July, and August have added eight, four, and five ‘shadow’ vessels, respectively.
In August 2026, seven vessels transported Russian oil products for the first time since 2020, three of which were owned or insured in G7+ countries at the time of loading.
In August 2026, two tankers transported Russian crude oil for the first time since 2020; one was owned or insured in G7+ jurisdictions.

In August 2026, 45 ‘shadow’ vessels were operating under false flags at the end of the month. Six of these falsely flagged vessels (13%) appear to be idle, having not loaded any cargo in over a year.
Of the 45 falsely flagged vessels, 14 (31%) have carried both Russian and Iranian oil, alternating between the two sanctioned trades, suggesting a shared ‘shadow’ infrastructure that serves Russia and Iran interchangeably.
A spell of inactivity rarely signals a return to transporting non-sanctioned oil. Of the false-flagged tankers that went idle for over a year and have since resumed loading oil, 18 of 30 came back still flying a false flag, most often switching to transport Iranian, Venezuelan, or Omani cargo instead of Russian oil. All twelve vessels that returned under a verified flag went straight back to delivering Russian cargo.
Five vessels delivered EUR 190 mn of Russian crude oil and oil products while flying a false flag in August.
Of the three false-flagged vessels that loaded crude oil in August 2026, two loaded in Nakhodka on Russia’s Pacific coast and one at Novorossiysk on the Black Sea.

Cameroon became the largest flag for Russian ‘shadow’ fleet vessels after Russia’s own registry in December 2025. As our June monthly report set out, the growth of vessels transporting Russian oil that were portrayed as sailing under the Cameroonian flag did not come entirely from the Cameroonian state. Another body had hijacked its registry, issuing fraudulent registrations under the country’s name. Cameroon has since concluded that the registrations issued to those vessels were never valid, and has been working to strike them off the list of tankers registered under its flag.
According to our analysis of Equasis data, Cameroon struck 26 of these vessels off its flag registry in July and a further 11 in August, taking the number in the Russian trade from 140 in February to 83 at the end of August, and it has registered no new vessels that transport Russian fossil fuels since June. Of those 83 vessels, 67 are recorded as legitimately registered as flying the Cameroon flag, though 23 of them have flown a false flag at some prior point. Unfortunately, Equasis data is lagging behind this exodus. Cameroonian-flagged vessels still shown as legitimate in our data may include vessels that the legitimate registry has already deregistered, and some of those 67 vessels could still be falsely flagged to the fraudulent registry.
In August 2026, no Russian ‘shadow’ tankers were reported to have been seized or detained. However, on 30 August 2026, forces operating under the EU’s Operation IRINI boarded the sanctioned tanker named Sun (IMO number 9293117) in the Mediterranean on suspicion that it was sailing under a false flag. According to EU High Representative Kaja Kallas, it was the sixth suspected ‘shadow’ fleet vessel boarded by EU naval operations in recent months.
The Sun has carried a Cameroonian registration recorded as legitimate since February 2026, taken up after two consecutive false flags, Benin from July 2025 and Timor-Leste from October 2025. It is therefore not counted among the 45 falsely flagged vessels above. Should the suspicion behind the boarding of the vessel be correct, the count of falsely flagged cases in this section is an underestimate.

‘Shadow’ tankers pose significant risks to ecology and the impact of sanctions

In August 2026, 311 vessels exported Russian crude oil and oil products. Among them, 161 were G7+ owned or insured tankers, and the remaining 150 were ‘shadow’ tankers. Additionally, 49% (73 in total) of these ‘shadow’ tankers were at least 20 years old.
Older ‘shadow’ tankers transporting Russian oil through EU waters pose environmental and financial risks due to their age, poor maintenance, and inadequate protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance. In the event of an oil spill or accident, coastal states may face significant cleanup costs and damage to their marine ecosystems.
The cost of cleanup and compensation from an oil spill by tankers with dubious insurance could amount to over EUR 1 bn for taxpayers in coastal countries.

In August 2026, an estimated EUR 98 mn worth of Russian oil was transferred across ten ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in EU waters.
All STS transfers of Russian oil in EU waters were conducted in Spanish (45%), Cypriot (30%), and Greek waters (25%). G7+ tankers carried all ten transfers.
Daily transfers averaged EUR 3.2 mn in August 2026.
Every STS transfer in EU waters in August involved oil products rather than crude oil.

How can Ukraine’s allies tighten the screws?

Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues have fallen since the sanctions were implemented, subsequently constricting Putin’s ability to fund his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, much more should be done to limit Russia’s export earnings and constrain the funding of the Kremlin’s war chest.

Lower the oil price cap to a baseline that tightens Russian revenues

The oil price cap policy has failed to impose a durable constraint on Russian crude export earnings, working only briefly and selectively for Urals while leaving other grades and export channels largely unaffected. Urals prices have fallen below the former USD 60-per-barrel cap for merely short periods. The cap was lowered to USD 44.10 per barrel on 1 February 2026 and subsequently frozen at that level under the EU’s 21st sanctions package. Meanwhile, ESPO-grade crude has consistently traded above both price cap levels because of strong demand from China and other Pacific markets.

G7+ sanctions have focused on Russian revenues rather than on restricting Russian export volumes — aimed at keeping Russian barrels flowing in global markets and easing fears of supply constraints. Policies such as the price cap are mainly aimed at reducing the price at which Russia could sell their oil.

In January 2026, as Russian oil prices fell sharply due to market oversupply, the EU proposed a ban on maritime services that facilitate Russia’s crude oil exports. Subsequently, in April 2026, the EU adopted its 20th sanctions package, which includes the basis for a future maritime services ban on Russian crude oil and petroleum products; however, it will be implemented only if an agreement is reached with the G7 and the Price Cap Coalition members. The maritime services ban would have, for the first time, targeted Russian oil export volumes and aimed at shrinking the tanker capacity required to transport Russia’s oil globally.

A massive spike in oil prices following reduced flows of fossil fuel shipments through the Strait of Hormuz has prompted a rethink of this policy to avoid creating further supply crunches in global markets. Therefore, in the face of the current energy crisis of 2026, CREA recommends that the price cap coalition either fix the price cap policy to a base level that severely restricts Russian revenues or implement a value-based sanction, such as a tax or surcharge on the use of Western maritime services for transporting Russia’s fossil fuels. A tax imposed by sanctioning countries on the use of Western maritime services to transport Russian crude oil and petroleum products could leverage their influence over trade to reduce Russian exporters’ profits, make Russian oil less commercially attractive, and generate revenue that could be used to support Ukraine.

Note: CREA now uses an updated model based on the observed G7+ share of the tanker fleet transporting Russian crude and oil products. This replaces the previous fixed estimate of the lower price cap and tighter enforcement level, which overstated the G7+ share, and accounts for the revised results.

CREA recommends that the price cap for crude oil is set at a lower level of USD 30 per barrel — still well above Russia’s production cost, which averages USD 15 per barrel. A lower price cap level for both premium (modelled at USD 45 per barrel) and discounted oil products (USD 25 per barrel) is also recommended to constrain Russia’s export earnings. These price cap levels would have slashed Russia’s seaborne crude oil export revenue by 27% from the start of the EU sanctions in December 2022 until the end of August 2026.
In August alone, a fully enforced USD 30 per barrel price cap and lower product caps would have slashed Russian revenues by 26% (EUR 3 bn).
CREA recommends lowering the oil product price caps, which have remained unchanged since they were introduced in February 2023. With Western-owned or insured tankers now carrying a greater value of Russian oil products than crude oil, policymakers should not overlook their leverage over the transportation of these products.
Lowering the price cap would be deflationary, reducing Russia’s oil export prices and inducing more production from Russia to make up for the drop in revenue.

For the price cap policy to achieve its desired impact, strong enforcement is key. In August 2026, full enforcement of the USD 44.1 per barrel price cap and the two respective oil product price cap levels (USD 100 per barrel for premium to crude oil products and USD 45 per barrel for discount to crude oil products) would have reduced Russia’s oil export revenues by 15% (approximately EUR 1.7 bn) compared to zero compliance with the policy.
If 50% of Russian oil transported on G7+ tankers complied with the current price cap levels, Russia’s oil export revenues in August 2026 would have been approximately EUR 853 mn (8%) lower than under a scenario with no price-cap compliance.

Create better enforcement mechanisms for the price cap policy

Sanctioning countries must implement measures that address attestation fraud — a key enabler of non-compliance. Maritime insurers or vessel owners currently do not have direct access to pricing information for the oil they insure or transport and are reliant on attestation documents provided by oil traders for price cap compliance.
At the same time, the majority of Russian crude oil is traded by opaque entities located outside price cap coalition countries — such as the UAE and Hong Kong. These traders can fraudulently underreport the price that they paid to attain Western maritime services for the transport of Russian oil.
Maritime insurers and oil traders must be required to obtain a bank statement showing that the Russian oil was traded below the price cap to avoid fraudulent attestation documents being produced. This bank statement must be verified by the bank itself to reduce the risk of the oil trader fraudulently producing documents. It would also enable maritime service providers to independently verify the price paid for the oil.
As an alternative to amending and enforcing the price cap policy, sanctioning jurisdictions could utilise their leverage to tax Russia’s use of G7+ maritime services when transporting its fossil fuels.

Restrict the growth of ‘shadow’ tankers & tighten regulations targeting the refining loophole

Frequent sanctioning of Russian ‘shadow’ vessels has shifted Russian oil back to tankers owned or insured in G7+ countries. Nonetheless, Russian ‘shadow’ tankers still hold sway over the transport of Russian crude oil. In addition, many sanctioned vessels continue to deliver oil to ports globally, with EU and UK sanctions in particular being frequently violated. Sanctioning countries must align their vessel lists and enforcement paradigms for a magnified effect on their operations.
Maritime coastal states should intensify efforts to monitor, inspect, and detain ‘shadow’ fleet vessels that lack legal passage rights, such as unflagged, unlawfully idle, or security-risk vessels. Authorities must enforce and improve environmental and navigation laws within their territorial waters, investigating and boarding suspicious vessels when justified. Crews involved in criminal activity should face prosecution, and noncompliant ships and personnel should be subject to international arrest warrants.
In its 18th sanctions package, the EU banned the imports of ‘oil refined from Russian crude’. The regulation bans imports from countries that are ‘net importers’ of crude oil. Net export status does not preclude the import and refining of Russian-origin crude, especially in jurisdictions with flexible or opaque crude sourcing practices. To close this enforcement gap, the exemption should be applied at the refinery level rather than the national level. Refined petroleum products should be subject to import restrictions if produced at facilities that have processed Russian crude within the past six months, regardless of the final product’s declared origin or the host country’s net export position.
The exemptions for countries including the UK, the US, Canada, Norway, and Switzerland create an opportunity for oil products refined from Russian crude to be re-exported to the EU. This gap should be closed to ensure the sanctions are comprehensive and watertight. The EU should work with its partners to encourage them to also ban the import of oil products from refineries processing Russian crude.
Imports of oil products or petrochemicals from storage terminals or re-export hubs in non-sanctioning countries that have received a shipment of Russian oil in the previous six months should be prohibited from exporting to sanctioning jurisdictions. This aims to prevent re-export hubs from obfuscating the origin of imported Russian oil products that are then sent to sanctioning countries, as seen in suspicious cases observed in Turkiye and Georgia.

Stronger sanctions enforcement and monitoring of violations

Despite clear evidence of violations, there is a need for stronger enforcement of penalties by agencies against shippers, insurers, and vessel owners. This information must be shared widely in the public domain. Penalties against violating entities increase the perceived risk of being caught and serve as a deterrent.
Penalties for violating the price cap must be significantly harsher. If found guilty of violating sanctions, vessels should be fined and permanently banned from accessing Western maritime services or entering ports in sanctioning jurisdictions.
The G7+ countries should ban STS transfers of Russian oil in their territorial waters. STS transfers undertaken by old ‘shadow’ tankers with questionable maintenance records and insurance pose environmental and financial risks to coastal states and support Russia logistically in exporting high volumes of crude oil. Coastal states should require oil tankers suspected of being ‘shadow’ tankers transporting Russian oil through their territorial waters to provide documentation showing adequate maritime insurance. If they fail to do so and are identified as a ‘shadow’ tanker, they should be added to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), UK, and European sanctions lists. This policy could limit Russia’s ability to transport its oil on ‘shadow’ tankers, which are not required to comply with the oil price cap policy.
To strengthen the integrity of maritime operations, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) must revise its guidelines to enhance transparency regarding maritime insurance. The IMO should mandate that flag states require shipowners and insurers to publicly disclose key financial information, including insurer solvency data, credit ratings from recognised agencies, and audited financial statements. Maritime authorities of coastal states should be legally able and encouraged to detain tankers that fly false flags and therefore pose environmental and security threats. The IMO should also promptly report tankers operating under false flags or with revoked registrations, improving transparency and enabling authorities to better track falsely flagged vessels.

Relevant reports:

See CREA’s live Russian Fossil Fuel Export Tracker and Russia Sanctions Tracker for the latest data on Russian fossil fuel exports and the impact of sanctions.

If you would like to obtain any of the data underlying these charts, please do not hesitate to contact us at queries-russia@energyandcleanair.org.

Note on methodology:

This monthly report uses CREA’s fossil shipment tracker methodology.
The data used for this monthly report is a snapshot taken at the end of each month. The data provider revises and verifies data on trades and oil shipments throughout the month. We subsequently update this verified data each month to ensure accuracy. This might mean that figures for the previous month will change in our updated subsequent monthly reports. For consistency, we do not amend the previous month’s report; instead, we treat the latest one as the most accurate data for revenues and volumes.
Russia’s daily revenues for commodities used in this report are derived as an average, using CREA’s pricing methodology.
The number of vessels with false flags per month is calculated using an end-of-month snapshot. In other words, for each month, vessels were counted if their most recent flag change at the end of the month was to a false flag.
This does not account for the vessels with multiple false flag periods (switches between false flags and verified flags, or between different false flags), only the most recent flag status at the end of the month.
To calculate the volume and value carried by false flags through EU waters, we filter for vessels that load from Russia’s northern and western ports (Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Vysotsk, St Petersburg, Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Kaliningrad) in the current month and check whether they have transited the Danish Straits, the English Channel or the Straits of Gibraltar.
We assume that falsely flagged vessels that have not transported a single cargo in the last 15 months are not operational and therefore exclude them from the analysis.
CREA’s estimates of the impact of a revised and lowered price cap have been updated since February 2025. These numbers are a more accurate representation of the revenue losses Russia would incur.