Authors: Luke Wickenden and Isaac Levi; Data scientist: Panda Rushwood

Key findings

In April 2026, Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues rose 4% month-on-month, climbing to EUR 733 mn per day — the highest revenues in two and a half years. Revenue growth occurred despite a 7% drop in export volumes.
Russian crude oil export revenues were stymied in April, falling 9% month-on-month. While there was a drop from the anomalous high revenues of March, April’s revenues were still 68% higher than February 2026 and 44% higher than April last year. The dip in revenues was largely due to a 24% month-on-month drop in seaborne crude export volumes after Ukraine’s drone strikes targeted Russia’s export infrastructure.
Flows through the Druzhba pipeline, which carries Russian crude oil to Hungary and Slovakia, resumed on 23 April after almost three months of inactivity, providing revenues of EUR 27 mn per day.
Eight shipments of oil products from refineries using Russian crude — and identified as high risk according to EU guidance — unloaded at EU ports in the month of April.
In April, imports of Russian LNG by China (EUR 379 mn) and Japan (EUR 163 mn) increased sharply by 32% and 57% month-on-month, respectively.
China’s imports of Russia’s Sokol grade crude saw a 36% month-on-month rise — the highest volume in over two years.
In April 2026, sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers were responsible for the highest share of Russia’s fossil fuel exports on record (54%). G7+ tankers transported a further 44% of the volume, with the remainder being transported by non-sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers.
In April 2026, 47 ‘shadow’ vessels were operating under false flags at the end of the month. Sixteen of these vessels (34%) appear to be idle, having not loaded any cargo in over six months. Five vessels delivered EUR 236 mn of Russian crude oil and oil products while flying a false flag in April.
Repeated Ukrainian drone strikes on the Rosneft-owned Tuapse refinery — Russia’s fifth-largest oil product export installation — contributed to a 65% year-on-year drop in oil product export volumes between January and April 2026.

Trends in total export revenues

In April 2026, Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues increased by 4% month-on-month to EUR 734 mn per day. This growth occurred despite a 7% month-on-month drop in export volumes.
Russia’s crude oil export revenues fell 9% month-on-month to EUR 374 mn per day. While there was a sharp rise in the price of Russian crude, Ukraine’s drone strikes targeting Russia’s export infrastructure drove a 24% drop in seaborne crude export volumes, thus resulting in lowered revenues.
Russian pipeline crude oil exports have increased by 36% month-on-month, influenced by the resumption of flows through the southern section of the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia on 23 April.
Early estimates, based on a Russian crude price of USD 93 per barrel, put the Kremlin’s Mineral Extraction Tax revenues at EUR 7.8 bn in April 2026.
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) revenues increased by a massive 25% to EUR 58 mn per day. The majority (55%) of Russia’s LNG cargoes arriving in April 2026 were unloaded at ports in EU Member States. Total volumes of Russian LNG unloaded were broadly flat (less than 1% month-on-month increase), with the lost EU volume absorbed by China and Japan, which increased those countries’ imports by 32% and 57%, respectively.
Pipeline gas export revenues increased by 15% to EUR 82 mn per day, in contrast to export volumes, which dropped 7% month-on-month. With only two LNG carriers transiting the Strait of Hormuz in April, gas supply remained constrained globally. The resultant high prices in the European market (+24% year-on-year) saw Russia benefit from higher gas export earnings.
Revenues from exports of seaborne oil products saw a 32% month-on-month increase, earning Russia EUR 173 mn per day. Export volumes rose by a much smaller 9% month-on-month.
Coal export revenues grew by 5% month-on-month, reaching EUR 45 mn per day, while export volumes rose by 3%.

Clean energy shields EU households from gas price shocks, saving billions on power bills

CREA’s recent analysis shows that EU countries with the cleanest energy mixes will save 58% more on electricity bills than Member States that remain heavily reliant on fossil fuels.

Following the outbreak of conflict between Israel, the US, and Iran on 28 February 2026, European gas markets recorded their sharpest price surge in two years. Within two days of the first strikes, Dutch TTF gas prices rose 68% to EUR 52.8/MWh, as global LNG markets reshuffled to compensate for disruptions to Qatari supply.

Despite renewed volatility in global gas markets and concerns over Europe’s low gas storage levels, CREA’s analysis found that the EU is significantly less vulnerable to fossil fuel price shocks than it was during the 2022 energy crisis following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Based on electricity demand and generation trends recorded in 2025, the EU is projected to save EUR 5.8 bn in electricity costs in 2026 as clean energy deployment displaces expensive gas-fired generation. These savings could be even greater if gas did not continue to set electricity prices across many EU markets through the bloc’s marginal pricing mechanism.

In 2025, every EUR 1/MWh rise in gas prices increased EU electricity prices by EUR 0.37/MWh — an 8% reduction in sensitivity compared to 2022. This decline is directly linked to the growing share of clean energy in the EU power mix, which increased by 14% between 2022 and 2025.

Every EU Member State reduced its exposure to gas price volatility compared to 2019, while the bloc simultaneously increased clean energy generation by an average of 28%. Consumers in countries with the cleanest electricity mixes — Denmark, Finland, France, Sweden and Slovakia — are expected to save up to EUR 8.5 bn on electricity bills in 2026. Their savings will be 58% higher than those recorded in the five countries with the dirtiest energy mixes: Poland, Italy, Greece, Estonia and the Netherlands.

Spain and Portugal also saw a sharp reduction in exposure to gas price volatility. A 21% increase in clean energy generation since 2022 — driven primarily by a 74% rise in solar output — reduced their sensitivity to gas prices by 53%.

In contrast, the Netherlands and Poland remain more exposed to gas price shocks despite substantial growth in clean energy deployment. In the Netherlands, gas remains the single largest source of electricity generation, while Poland’s push to replace coal with gas-fired generation has increased dependence on the fuel. Poland’s gas-fired power generation rose 132% between 2022 and 2025, contributing to an 87% increase in electricity price sensitivity to gas markets.

Hungary also recorded rising exposure to gas price volatility despite rapid solar growth, highlighting how insufficient grid infrastructure and flexibility constraints continue to force reliance on gas-fired generation to stabilise electricity systems.

The analysis highlights that clean energy is most effective at reducing electricity price volatility when it becomes the dominant generation source and displaces gas as the price setter in wholesale electricity markets.

Who is buying Russia’s fossil fuels?

Russia’s fossil fuel exports remain highly concentrated, with China dominating purchases of coal and crude oil, Turkiye leading purchases of oil products, and the EU remaining the largest buyer of LNG and pipeline gas — showing Moscow’s dependence on a narrow set of key customers.
Coal: From 5 December 2022 until the end of April 2026, China purchased 37% of all Russian coal exports. India (19%), Turkiye (15%), South Korea (12%), and Taiwan (4%) round out the top five buyers’ list.
Crude oil: China has bought 49% of Russia’s crude exports, followed by India (37%), Turkiye (6%), and the EU (5%).
Oil products: Turkiye, the largest buyer, has purchased 26% of Russia’s oil product exports, followed by China (13%), Brazil (11%), and Singapore (8%).
LNG: The EU remains the largest buyer of Russian LNG, accounting for almost half (49%) of Russia’s total LNG exports, followed by China (23%) and Japan (19%).
Pipeline gas: The EU is the largest buyer, purchasing 32% of Russia’s pipeline gas exports, followed by China (30%) and Turkiye (30%).

In April 2026, China remained the largest global buyer of Russian fossil fuels, accounting for 41% (EUR 7.3 bn) of Russia’s export revenues from the top five importers. Crude oil made up 75% (EUR 5.5 bn) of China’s purchases, followed by pipeline gas (EUR 565 mn) and oil products (EUR 528 mn). Coal (EUR 348 mn) and LNG (EUR 2379 mn) constituted the remainder of their imports.
China’s total seaborne crude import volumes saw a marginal 25% month-on-month decrease in April. This was mirrored by Russian imports, which decreased by 24%. China’s imports of Russian Sokol grade crude, exported from Russia’s eastern port of De Kastri, saw a 36% month-on-month rise — the highest volume in over two years.
While imports to most Chinese installations fell in April, the Dalian refinery imported Russian crude for the first time since September 2025. This refinery was once the largest processor of Russian crude and had declared plans to restart operations at the start of the year.
India was the second-largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels in April 2026, importing a total of EUR 5 bn of Russian hydrocarbons. Crude oil constituted 90% of India’s purchases, totalling EUR 4.5 bn. Coal (EUR 297 mn) and oil products (EUR 209 mn) constituted the remainder of their monthly imports.
India’s total crude import volumes recorded a 3.7% reduction in April. This is partially explained by a 19.4% month-on-month decrease in Russian imports. There was a substantial change in the installations’ unloading of Russian crude, with Vadinar and Jamnagar refineries’ imports decreasing by almost 92% and 38%, respectively, while the state-owned IndianOil Vadinar’s increased by 87%. The decline in Vadinar refinery’s Russian crude imports was driven by maintenance-related shutdowns beginning on 9 April 2026, as the refinery runs exclusively on Russian feedstock.
The state-owned New Mangalore and Visakhapatnam refineries had stopped Russian imports at the end of November 2025, but purchases resumed in March 2026 and continued into April, with Visakhapatnam’s Russian imports increasing by 149% month-on-month.
Turkiye was the third-largest importer, purchasing EUR 3 bn of Russian hydrocarbons in April. Pipeline gas accounted for the largest share at 41% (EUR 1.2 bn), followed by oil products (EUR 1.1 bn), and crude oil (EUR 505 mn). The remainder of Turkiye’s monthly imports from Russia were made up of coal (EUR 169 mn).
In April 2026, Turkiye’s total imports of seaborne crude saw a 26% month-on-month decrease, with an 18% decrease in imports from Russia.
The EU was the fourth-largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels, accounting for almost 10% (EUR 1.7 bn) of Russia’s export revenues from the top five importers.
Fifty-nine percent of the EU’s imports (EUR 1 bn) consisted of LNG, and another 30% was pipeline gas. The remaining 11% consisted of crude oil. The EU’s monthly purchases of Russian LNG remained high despite the introduction of the REPowerEU Regulation (EU) 2026/261, which banned spot-market purchases from 25 April 2026. The EU’s share of Russian LNG imports dropped by 8% month-on-month, driven mainly by Spain halving its imports.
Saudi Arabia was the fifth-largest importer in April, with all of its purchases totalling EUR 683 mn, all of which were oil products. All Saudi imports of Russian refined fuels were unloaded at western ports, with no shipments of Russian oil products to Saudi ports transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

In April 2026, the five largest EU importers of Russian fossil fuels paid Russia a combined EUR 1.6 bn. Natural gas — partially sanctioned by the EU — accounted for 88% of the amount. The five largest EU importers purchased EUR 957 mn of Russian LNG in April, EUR 419 mn of pipeline gas, and EUR 189 mn of crude oil through the Druzhba pipeline.
Hungary and Slovakia received EUR 419 mn in pipeline gas via the Balkan Stream pipeline.
France was the EU’s largest importer, purchasing EUR 413 mn worth of Russian LNG in April. There was a 13% month-on-month increase in France’s imports of Russian LNG. Meanwhile, its total LNG unloadings dropped by 2% month-on-month.
Hungary was the second-largest buyer, importing EUR 380 mn of Russian fossil fuels. In April, Hungary’s imports of Russian fossil fuels consisted of pipeline gas and crude oil. Flows through the Druzhba pipeline, which carries Russian crude oil to Hungary and Slovakia, resumed on 23 April after almost three months of inactivity.
Belgium was the third-biggest importer in the bloc, importing EUR 363 mn of Russian LNG in April. Belgium’s LNG imports from Russia rose 33% month-on-month. Meanwhile, its total LNG unloadings dropped by 3% month-on-month.
Slovakia was the fourth-largest EU importer, receiving EUR 228 mn in Russian fossil fuel imports. Their imports consisted of EUR 124 mn in pipeline gas purchases and EUR 104 mn in crude oil purchases via the Druzhba pipeline.
Spain was the fifth-largest importer, receiving EUR 181 mn of Russian fossil fuels, all of which was LNG. Spain’s Russian LNG imports dropped a significant 56% month-on-month.

Despite the EU’s ban on imports of oil products made from Russian crude on 21 January 2026, eight shipments of oil products from refineries using Russian crude — and identified as high risk according to EU guidance — were unloaded at EU ports in the month of April.
Seven of these shipments departed from Turkiye’s refineries and one from Georgia.
Cyprus was the largest recipient of shipments from these refineries running on Russian crude, unloading four shipments in April. Italy, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain all received one shipment each.
Enforcement agencies in Member States must investigate shipments of oil products imported from refineries that run on Russian crude to prevent Russian oil molecules from entering the bloc, which would violate the EU’s recently implemented ban.
The Hengyi refinery in Brunei, whose Russian crude imports saw a 16% rise month-on-month, exported two shipments of diesel valued at EUR 76 mn to Australia in April.
Refineries using Russian crude in India, Turkiye, Brunei, and Georgia exported EUR 760 mn of oil products to sanctioning countries in April 2026. The importers included the EU (EUR 145 mn), Australia (EUR 399 mn), and the US (EUR 216 mn). An estimated EUR 232 mn of these products were refined from Russian crude.
There was an overall 30% month-on-month decrease in exports from these refineries to sanctioning countries. The UK and Canada received no shipments from these refineries in April. Exports to the EU and Australia fell 52% and 29% month-on-month, respectively, while those to the US rose 12% month-on-month.
Exports to the US originated in the Jamnagar refinery in India and the SOCAR-owned STAR refinery in Turkiye. In April, as much as 64% of the STAR refinery’s feedstock and 14% of the Jamnagar refineries’ feedstock came from Russia.
The Kulevi refinery in Georgia has run solely on Russian crude and has not received a single shipment of non-Russian crude, while also exporting refined products to the EU after the ban came into force. At the end of March, the CEO of the refinery’s operating company stated that they are working to replace Russian crude oil. Furthermore, the refinery narrowly escaped being added to the EU sanctions list in March.

How are oil prices changing?

In April 2026, the average price of Russia’s Urals crude rose further, up by 19% month-on-month to USD 112.3 per barrel, remaining more than double the updated EU and UK price cap of USD 44.1 per barrel, which took effect on 1 February 2026.

In April, the price discount of Urals-grade crude oil relative to the global benchmark Brent plummeted as demand for Russian crude increased following the extended US sanctions waiver, amid constraints on tanker availability and other market factors. While Russian crude prices have increased significantly, influenced by higher freight and insurance costs for the longer voyages involving sanctioned Russian crude, Free on Board (FOB) prices are likely still at a discount to Brent. CREA’s crude oil price data models Russia’s oil prices indexed to futures.

Sanctioned tankers carry the majority of Russian crude despite G7+ sanctions

In April 2026, over half (54%) of Russia’s seaborne oil was transported by ‘shadow’ tankers under sanctions — up sharply from 48% in March. A further 38% of the volume was transported by G7+ tankers. The remainder was transported by non-sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers.
G7+ tankers transported 23% of Russian crude oil exports in April, while non-sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers accounted for 8% of the total. The largest share, 69%, was carried by sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers.
For oil products, Russia’s dependence on G7+ tankers is higher; these tankers transported 67% of Russian oil products in April. Sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers carried 26% of total Russian oil product volumes, while non-sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers accounted for 7% of the volume.
In April, sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers were responsible for the highest share of Russia’s fossil fuel exports on record.

In April 2026, 47 ‘shadow’ vessels were operating under false flags at the end of the month. Sixteen vessels (34%) appear to be idle, having not loaded any cargo in over six months. Five vessels delivered EUR 236 mn of Russian crude oil and oil products while flying a false flag in April.
Eight (13%) of the 47 false-flag vessels most recently loaded Iranian rather than Russian crude oil or oil products, with the majority alternating between the two, reflecting a shared infrastructure of vessels servicing both sanctioned oil trades.
Only one false-flagged vessel loaded EUR 18mn of Russian naphtha from its Baltic Sea ports in April, though it has not yet transited the Danish Straits.
In April 2026, there was a reduction in the number of reported detentions and inspections of Russian ‘shadow’ tankers, from four in March 2026 to just one in April. On 3 April, the UK and EU sanctioned Russian ‘shadow’ tanker Flora 1 was boarded and detained by the Swedish Coast Guard after authorities traced a 12-kilometre oil spill in the Baltic Sea to the vessel. Swedish Authorities found no conclusive evidence linking Flora 1 to the spill and released the vessel on 4 April 2026. The incident highlights scrutiny of ‘shadow’ tankers violating environmental regulations.
Despite the UK Government’s announcement on 25 March that it had given permission to the British military to board sanctioned ‘shadow fleet’ vessels transiting UK waters, there were no reported detentions of Russian ‘shadow’ tankers by UK coastal authorities in April 2026.

‘Shadow’ tankers pose significant risks to ecology and the impact of sanctions

In April 2026, 346 vessels exported Russian crude oil and oil products. Among them, 218 were G7+ owned or insured tankers, and the remaining 128 were ‘shadow’ tankers. Additionally, 42% (54 in total) of these ‘shadow’ tankers were at least 20 years old or older.
Older ‘shadow’ tankers transporting Russian oil through EU waters pose environmental and financial risks due to their age, poor maintenance, and inadequate protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance. In the event of an oil spill or accident, coastal states may face significant cleanup costs and damage to their marine ecosystems.
The cost of cleanup and compensation from an oil spill by tankers with dubious insurance could amount to over EUR 1 bn for taxpayers in coastal countries.

In April 2026, an estimated EUR 209 mn worth of Russian oil was transferred via ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in EU waters.
All STS transfers of Russian oil in EU waters were conducted in Cypriot (73%), Lithuanian (25%), and Spanish waters (2%).
One shipment of Russian oil, valued at EUR 37 mn, appears to have undertaken an STS transfer near Klaipeda, Lithuania. It currently has an unknown buyer and destination.
Daily transfers averaged EUR 7 mn in April 2026. G7+ tankers conducted 100% of these transfers.

How can Ukraine’s allies tighten the screws?

Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues have fallen since the sanctions were implemented, subsequently constricting Putin’s ability to fund his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, much more should be done to limit Russia’s export earnings and constrain the funding of the Kremlin’s war chest.

Lower the oil price cap to a baseline that tightens Russian revenues

The oil price cap has failed to impose a durable constraint on Russian crude export earnings, working only briefly and selectively for Urals while leaving other grades and export channels largely unaffected. Urals prices have dipped below the USD 60 per barrel cap level (the crude oil price cap level was lower to USD 44.1 per barrel as of 1 February 2026) for mere short periods of time, while ESPO crude has consistently traded well above the cap due to its structural orientation toward China and Pacific markets.

G7+ sanctions have focused on Russian revenues rather than on restricting Russian export volumes — aimed at keeping Russian barrels flowing in global markets and easing fears of supply constraints. Policies such as the price cap are mainly aimed at reducing the price at which Russia could sell their oil.

In January 2026, as Russian oil prices fell sharply due to market oversupply, the EU proposed a ban on maritime services that facilitate Russia’s crude oil exports. Subsequently, in April 2026, the EU adopted its 20th sanctions package, which includes the basis for a future maritime services ban on Russian crude oil and petroleum products; however, it will be implemented only if an agreement is reached with the G7 and the Price Cap Coalition members. The maritime services ban would have, for the first time, targeted Russian oil export volumes and aimed at shrinking the tanker capacity required to transport Russia’s oil globally.

A massive spike in oil prices following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has led to a rethink of this policy to avoid creating further supply crunches in global markets. Therefore, in the face of the current energy crisis of 2026, CREA recommends that the price cap coalition either fix the price cap policy to a base level that severely restricts Russian revenues or implement a value-based sanction, such as a tax on the use of Western maritime services for transporting Russia’s fossil fuels.

For the price cap policy to achieve its desired impact, strong enforcement is key. In April 2026, full enforcement of the USD 44.1 per barrel price cap would have reduced revenues by 46% (approximately EUR 6.7 bn).
CREA recommends that the price cap be set to a lowered level of USD 30 per barrel — still well above Russia’s production cost, which averages USD 15 per barrel. This price cap would have slashed Russia’s oil export revenue by 38% (EUR 184 bn) from the start of the EU sanctions in December 2022 until the end of April 2026.
In April alone, a USD 30 per barrel price cap would have slashed Russian revenues by 47% (EUR 7 bn).
Lowering the price cap would be deflationary, reducing Russia’s oil export prices and inducing more production from Russia to make up for the drop in revenue.

Create better enforcement mechanisms for the price cap policy

Sanctioning countries must implement measures that address attestation fraud — a key enabler of non-compliance. Maritime insurers or vessel owners currently do not have direct access to the pricing information for the oil they insure or transport, and are reliant on attestation documents provided by oil traders for price cap compliance.
At the same time, the majority of Russian crude oil is currently being traded by opaque entities located outside price cap coalition countries — such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Hong Kong. These traders can fraudulently underreport the price that they paid to attain Western maritime services for the transport of Russian oil.
Maritime insurers and oil traders must be required to obtain a bank statement showing that the Russian oil was traded below the price cap to avoid fraudulent attestation documents being produced. This bank statement must be verified by the bank itself to reduce the risk of the oil trader fraudulently producing documents. It would also enable maritime service providers to independently verify the price paid for the oil.
As an alternative to amending and enforcing the price cap policy, sanctioning jurisdictions could utilise their leverage to tax Russia’s use of G7+ maritime services when transporting its fossil fuels.

Restrict the growth of ‘shadow’ tankers & tighten regulations targeting the refining loophole

Frequent sanctioning of Russian ‘shadow’ vessels has shifted Russian oil back to tankers owned or insured in G7+ countries. Nonetheless, Russian ‘shadow’ tankers still hold sway on the transport of Russian crude oil. In addition, many sanctioned vessels continue to deliver oil to ports globally, with EU and UK sanctions in particular being frequently violated. Sanctioning countries must align their vessel lists and enforcement paradigms for a magnified effect on their operations.
Maritime coastal states should intensify efforts to monitor, inspect, and detain ‘shadow’ fleet vessels that lack legal passage rights, such as unflagged, unlawfully idle, or security-risk vessels. Authorities must enforce and improve environmental and navigation laws within their territorial waters, investigating and boarding suspicious vessels when justified. Crews involved in criminal activity should face prosecution, and noncompliant ships and personnel should be subject to international arrest warrants.
In its 18th sanctions package, the EU banned the imports of ‘oil refined from Russian crude’. The regulation bans imports from countries that are ‘net importers’ of crude oil. Net export status does not preclude the import and refining of Russian-origin crude, especially in jurisdictions with flexible or opaque crude sourcing practices. To close this enforcement gap, the exemption should be applied at the refinery level rather than the national level. Refined petroleum products should be subject to import restrictions if produced at facilities that have processed Russian crude within the past six months, regardless of the final product’s declared origin or the host country’s net export position.
The exemptions for countries including the UK, the US, Canada, Norway, and Switzerland create an opportunity for oil products refined from Russian crude to be re-exported to the EU. This gap should be closed to ensure the sanctions are comprehensive and watertight. The EU should work with its partners to encourage them to also ban the importation of oil products from refineries running on Russian crude.
Imports of oil products or petrochemicals from storage terminals or re-export hubs in non-sanctioning countries that have received a shipment of Russian oil in the previous six months should be prohibited from exporting to sanctioning jurisdictions. This aims to prevent re-export hubs from obfuscating the origin of imported Russian oil products that are then sent to sanctioning countries, such as in the suspicious cases observed in Turkiye and Georgia.

Stronger sanctions enforcement and monitoring of violations

Despite clear evidence of violations, there is a need for stronger enforcement of penalties by agencies against shippers, insurers, and vessel owners. This information must be shared widely in the public domain. Penalties against violating entities increase the perceived risk of being caught and serve as a deterrent.
Penalties for violating the price cap must be significantly harsher. Current penalties include a 90-day ban on vessels from securing maritime services after violating the price cap, a relatively minor sanction. If found guilty of violating sanctions, vessels should be fined and banned in perpetuity.
The G7+ countries should ban STS transfers of Russian oil in G7+ waters. STS transfers undertaken by old ‘shadow’ tankers with questionable maintenance records and insurance pose environmental and financial risks to coastal states and support Russia logistically in exporting high volumes of crude oil. Coastal states should require oil tankers suspected of being ‘shadow’ tankers transporting Russian oil through their territorial waters to provide documentation showing adequate maritime insurance. Upon failing to do so, having been identified as a ‘shadow’ tanker, they should be added to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), UK, and European sanctions lists. This policy could limit Russia’s ability to transport its oil on ‘shadow’ tankers, which are not required to comply with the oil price cap policy.
To strengthen the integrity of maritime operations, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) must revise its guidelines to enhance transparency regarding maritime insurance. The IMO should mandate that flag states require shipowners and insurers to publicly disclose key financial information, including insurer solvency data, credit ratings from recognised agencies, and audited financial statements. Maritime authorities of coastal states should be legally able and encouraged to detain tankers that fly false flags and therefore pose environmental and security threats.

Relevant reports:

Note on methodology:

This monthly report uses CREA’s fossil shipment tracker methodology.

The data used for this monthly report is taken as a snapshot at the end of each month. The data provider revises and verifies data on trades and oil shipments throughout the month. We subsequently update this verified data each month to ensure accuracy. This might mean that figures for the previous month change in our updated subsequent monthly reports. For consistency, we do not amend the previous month’s report; instead, we treat the latest one as the most accurate data for revenues and volumes.

Russia’s daily revenues for commodities used in this report are derived as an average, using CREA’s pricing methodology.
The number of vessels with false flags per month is calculated using an end-of-month snapshot. In other words, for each month, vessels were counted if their most recent flag change at the end of the month was to a false flag.

This does not account for the vessels with multiple false flag periods (switches between false flags and verified flags, or between different false flags), only the most recent flag status at the end of the month.

To calculate the volume and value carried by false flags through EU waters we filter for vessels that load from Russia’s northern and western ports (Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Vysotsk, St Petersburg, Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Kaliningrad) in the current month and check whether they have transited the Danish Straits, the English Channel or the Straits of Gibraltar.

We assume that falsely flagged vessels that have not transported a single cargo in the last two years are not operational and therefore remove them from the analysis.

CREA’s estimates of the impact of a revised and lowered price cap have been updated since February 2025. These numbers are a more accurate representation of the revenue losses Russia would incur. Our earlier numbers significantly underestimated the impact of a lower price cap due to a bug that we identified that mislabelled commodities in our model.