Despite Russia’s reliance on sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers, crude export volumes 6% above pre-invasion
This year marks four years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) began tracking Russia’s fossil fuel revenues and trends that are financing Putin’s war on Ukraine.
One year ago, CREA pointed out that the EU had spent more on Russian fossil fuels than aid to Ukraine, and in early January of this year, CREA’s Russian fossil tracker passed EUR 1 trillion.
Despite these numbers, in the fourth year of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s revenues from fossil fuel exports dropped 19% year-on-year, and are now 27% below pre full-scale invasion levels. Russia’s revenues from fossil fuel exports in the fourth year of the invasion totalled EUR 193 bn, and the EU’s imports specifically totalled EUR 14.5 bn, a substantial 36% year-on-year reduction.
The EU has systematically shifted away from Moscow’s fossil fuels, diversifying to reliance from other sources. The EU’s sanctions on refined oil made from Russian crude, combined with the US Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) sanctions on the two Russian oil majors Rosneft and Lukoil, almost immediately resulted in Russian crude sales, to India in particular, plummeting to the lowest levels since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. India’s Russian crude imports, totalling EUR 31.6 bn, saw a 9% decrease in volumes, while China’s imports (valued at EUR 43 bn) reduced by 14% in the fourth year of the invasion.
Threats from the US in the form of trade tariffs and diplomatic standoffs had limited effect in terms of reducing the consumption of Russian oil for countries like India, China and Turkiye. Sanctions succeeded, where threats failed.
Still, EU Member States Hungary and Slovakia have continued their imports of Russian oil, and Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) continues entering EU ports under long-term contracts. The implementation of REPowerEU’s tightened regulations at the beginning of February 2026 has however finally addressed the long-awaited withdrawal of Russian gas from Europe.
Increasing reliance on clean energy to assert energy independence must come next by streamlining permissions, managing grid bottlenecks, electrification, and investing in energy storage, the lack of which points to ineffective policies to date.
There is also more work to be done to tackle Russia’s ‘shadow’ tankers.
The EU, UK, US, Australia, and Canada have collectively sanctioned 565 unique vessels that have carried Russian fossil fuels since the full-scale invasion. In the fourth year of the full-scale invasion alone, these countries sanctioned a total of 312 unique vessels, more than the 253 sanctioned in the first three years combined. The EU led with 397 designations, followed by the UK (341), Australia (196), and Canada (182).
Sanctioned tankers transported virtually none of Russia’s seaborne crude exports in the first quarter of 2024. By the fourth quarter of 2025, they carried over 60%, illustrating how Russia remains dependent on sanctioned tankers and has been unable to replace them with unsanctioned tonnage. For Russian crude, volumes transported by G7+ owned or insured tankers held relatively steady at around 29% through the year.
Russian revenues from crude oil sales dropped by a significant 18% year-on-year (EUR 85.5 bn) while volumes dropped by a less stark 6% (215 mn tonnes). Export volumes continued to remain 6% above pre-invasion levels, highlighting how G7+ sanctions on the ‘shadow’ fleet have failed to cut supplies, even while forcing deeper price discounts on their oil sales. The three largest buyers — China, India and Turkiye — accounted for 93% of Russia’s crude exports in this period, receiving a total 201 mn tonnes valued at EUR 79.7 bn.
‘Shadow’ vessels operating under false flags grew from 12 at the start of 2025 to a peak of 109 in October — a more than nine-fold increase. By January 2026, they had declined to 81 and a mere three vessels adopted false flags in January, compared to 32 in July 2025.
The decline in false flagging was due to several factors, including targeting by the French navy, as well as by the US Coast Guard. However, it also coincided with a sharp increase in vessels registering directly under the Russian flag. At the start of 2025, 106 vessels in the ‘shadow’ fleet were flagged by Russia. This figure remained relatively stable through the first half of the year, reaching 111 by June before climbing upwards from July and reaching 120 by October. In January 2026, 153 ‘shadow’ vessels were flagged directly under the Russian flag.
While false flagged tankers operate entirely outside the norms of maritime governance, Russian-flagged vessels are registered with a legitimate flag state — albeit one that is the target of sanctions. These shifts towards Russian flags signify an open acknowledgement of the Russian connection rather than fraudulent concealment.
Vessels operating under either false flags or the Russian flag were more or less stable between October 2025 and January 2026 — 229 and 234, respectively. While enforcement pressure may be pushing some operators away from false flags, the overall pool of vessels operating outside mainstream Western registries has held steady.
Policy recommendations
- Tackle loopholes, circumventions and gaps in sanctions
- Tackle the ‘shadow’ fleet to cut Russian fossil fuel revenues; establish strict Know Your Customer (KYC) standards for the sales of tankers from EU companies
- Cut off all G7+ services that facilitate the transport of Russian hydrocarbons globally
