As part of the EU’s sixth sanctions package against Russia adopted in June 2022, the EU granted the Central European countries of Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia an exemption from the Russian crude oil ban. This exemption allowed these landlocked countries to continue receiving Russian crude by pipeline (via the southern Druzhba pipeline) beyond the general EU embargo on Russian seaborne oil, which took effect in December 2022. The purpose of the EU derogation on Russian crude oil imports was to give these three landlocked countries extra time to reduce reliance on Russia.
This report published by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) and CREA has now revealed that Hungary and Slovakia have in fact exploited the exemption, offering weak justifications for continuing Russian crude imports, which in 2024 remained above pre-invasion levels — violating the intent of EU legislation.
Hungary and Slovakia have leveraged the exemption to undermine a common EU position on Ukraine and on strengthening sanctions against Russia, which must be agreed upon by all 27 Member States.
In January 2025, Hungary threatened to veto the extension of EU sanctions against Russia, a move that could have resulted in the unfreezing of over USD 200 bn in Russian assets within the EU. This threat was explicitly tied to demands for the continuation of Russian crude oil transit through Ukraine and to buyers in Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia.
Similarly, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico threatened to stop all financial and military aid to Ukraine unless the EU summit’s conclusions — held in March 2025 — explicitly “include[d] a requirement to reopen the transit of gas through Ukraine to Slovakia and Western Europe”. Unlike their EU counterparts who have — at least publicly — committed to ending reliance on Russian energy sources, Hungary and Slovakia have unambiguously signalled their intention to maintain their strategic dependence on Russian imports.
Hungary and Slovakia have imported 27 mn tonnes of crude worth EUR 13 bn and 32 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas (EUR 20 bn) since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion until the end of 2024. The intention of the oil derogation was to allow these EU Member States more time to reduce their reliance on Russian imports. In reality, Russian oil purchases have barely changed and in fact import volumes for both Hungary and Slovakia remain 2% higher in 2024 compared to pre-invasion levels (2021). The EU exemption legislation has no clear end date, meaning that MOL — the sole refiner in both Hungary and Slovakia and the last company in Europe still importing Russian crude oil — can legally continue its purchases, with no incentive to end imports that help finance Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
There are no technical and economic reasons for maintaining the EU’s sanctions exemption for Central Europe. The full decoupling from Russian energy in the region is not only feasible but essential for long-term energy security, European unity and to enhance the impact of the sanctions. Finally, the analysis also offers concrete policy measures to accelerate the Russian energy phaseout in Europe. Bulgaria has already proven that terminating the exemption from the EU sanctions and ending reliance on Russian oil is possible by completing an overnight transition away from a dependence on Russian energy. The country has since experienced stable or even falling fuel prices.
The EU needs to immediately end the derogation from the ban on the import of Russian oil that it has provided to the Central European Member States.
| 22 May 2025 – MOL’s Russian oil diversification announcement distracts from facts Just seven days after CREA and CSD published a report exposing Hungary and Slovakia’s failures to reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels, Hungarian oil and gas major MOL Group announced a new agreement with Hungarian power company MVM Group that could ‘increase the volume of alternative crude oil processed in its refineries by up to 160 thousand tonnes per year’. While this represents progress—potentially increasing non-Russian crude imports by nearly 20% compared to 2024 levels (814 thousand tonnes)—it would reduce both countries’ overall Russian oil reliance by a mere 1%. The Hungarian oil giant claims that ‘the more sources of crude oil we can bring into the landlocked countries of the region, the more secure and affordable fuel supply becomes’. Yet in 2024, Hungary and Slovakia remained 87% dependent on Russian crude transported through a single pipeline—the Druzhba, which transits a war zone and experienced two significant outages in 12 months. As CREA and CSD’s report demonstrates, no technical or infrastructural barriers prevent these countries from breaking free of their reliance on Russian crude. The Adria pipeline remains underutilised. What’s missing is political will. Both Hungary and Slovakia have exploited the exemption to the EU ban on Russian crude oil and have increased their imports through the Druzhba pipeline by 2% in 2024 compared to levels pre-full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The EU must implement legally binding measures to stop the continued flow of Russian crude oil that finances the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine. |
