By Petras Katinas & Vaibhav Raghunandan

Russian crude deliveries on vessels subject to the price cap saw a 36% month-on-month increase in March, showing the effect of sanctions on ‘shadow’ tankers

Key findings

In March, Russia’s monthly fossil fuel export revenues increased by 1% month-on-month, at EUR 637 mn per day.
Russian oil transported via G7+ owned or insured vessels rose by 20% month-on-month. Russian crude deliveries on G7+ owned or insured vessels saw a 36% month-on-month increase and were double the volumes transported by such vessels in January.
China and India’s seaborne crude imports from Russia saw a massive 42% and 41% month-on-month rise, respectively. These were the highest volumes of Russian crude imported by the two countries since October 2024 and July 2024, respectively.
Boosted by increased deliveries to countries in Asia, Russia’s seaborne crude oil exports rose to their highest levels in the last six months.
Since the EU introduced sanctions until the end of March 2025, thorough enforcement of the USD 60 price cap would have cut Russia’s export revenues by 11% (EUR 38.08 bn). In March 2025 alone, full enforcement of the price cap would have reduced revenues by 8% (approximately EUR 0.94 bn).
A lower price cap of USD 30 per barrel would have slashed Russia’s oil export revenue by 40% (EUR 134 bn) from the start of the EU sanctions in December 2022 until the end of March 2025. In March alone, a USD 30 per barrel price cap would have slashed Russian revenues by 39% (EUR 4.74 bn).

Trends in total export revenue

In March, Russia’s monthly fossil fuel export revenues increased 1% month-on-month, being valued at EUR 637 mn per day, while export volumes increased by 6%.
Revenues from seaborne crude oil increased by 14% month-on-month to EUR 212 mn per day, while export volumes surged by 24%.
Revenues from crude oil via pipeline dropped 2% to EUR 81 mn per day.
Russian Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) revenues dropped 23% to EUR 40 mn per day, and volumes decreased by 22%.
Revenues from pipeline gas decreased by 19% in March to EUR 64 mn per day, and the volume of pipeline gas exports also dropped by 11%.
Revenue from seaborne oil products increased by 6% month-on-month to EUR 178 mn per day.
Russian revenues from coal exports increased by 10% to EUR 60 mn per day.

Who is buying Russia’s fossil fuels?

Coal: From 5 December 2022 until the end of March 2025, China purchased 44% of all of Russia’s coal exports. India (19%), Turkey (11%), South Korea (10%), and Taiwan (5%) round off the top five buyers list.
Crude oil: China has bought 47% of Russia’s crude exports, followed by India (38%), the EU (6%), and Turkey (6%).
Oil products: Turkey, the largest buyer, has purchased 26% of Russia’s oil product exports, followed by China (13%), and Brazil (12%).
LNG: The EU was the largest buyer, purchasing 50% of Russia’s LNG exports, followed by China (21%), and Japan (19%).
Pipeline gas: The EU was the largest buyer, purchasing 38% of Russia’s pipeline gas, followed by China (29%), and Turkey (27%).

China remained the largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels in March. Their imports accounted for almost 43% (EUR 6.8 bn) of Russia’s monthly export earnings from the top five importers. Crude oil comprised 70% (EUR 3.8 bn) of China’s imports from Russia.
China’s seaborne crude imports from Russia saw a massive 42% month-on-month rise — reaching the highest volumes since October 2024. At the same time, China’s total seaborne crude imports also saw a 19% rise in March, with Russia holding a 12% share.
In March, India was the second-largest purchaser of Russian fossil fuels, importing fossil fuels worth EUR 4.4 bn. Crude oil accounted for 80% (EUR 3.5 bn) of these imports.
Mirroring the trend from China, India’s crude import volumes from Russia also saw a 41% month-on-month increase — the highest since July 2024. Their total imports also increased by 19% month-on-month with Russian crude comprising 36% of the total.
Over the past half a decade, March has been a month with increased crude deliveries to countries in Asia. This is linked to various reasons, key being that refiners tend to re-stock inventories after a period of planned maintenance. This is also often in anticipation of a seasonal rise in demand at the end of winter in the Northern Hemisphere.
While volumes of crude delivered to China and India increased massively, the Russian revenues from these sales did not rise proportionately — +16% for China; +32% for India — suggesting a drop in the prices paid for Russian crude by these countries.
Turkey was Russia’s third-largest importer of fossil fuels, contributing 15% (EUR 2.3 bn) of the total export earnings from its top five importers.
The EU was the fourth-largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels, with its imports accounting for 9% (EUR 1.4 bn) of the top five purchasers. Almost half of these imports were Russian LNG, valued at EUR 706 mn.
In March, Brazil bought EUR 828 mn of Russian fossil fuels, which consisted entirely of oil products.

In March, the five largest Russian fossil fuel-importing countries in the EU paid Russia a total of EUR 1.2 bn for their imports, over half of which were purchases of LNG. The EU has granted an exemption for Russian crude oil imported through the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. While Russian pipeline gas and LNG remain unsanctioned, the pipeline transit through Ukraine ended in December 2024, terminating Gazprom’s gas deliveries to Slovakia, Czechia, and Austria.
Hungary was the largest importer, purchasing EUR 412 mn of Russian fossil fuels in March. These included gas via pipeline (EUR 228 mn) and crude oil (EUR 184 mn).
France was the second-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels within the EU. Its imports, which included Russian LNG, totaled EUR 314 mn. However, the fact that this gas is imported via France does not necessarily mean it is consumed there. A recent study indicates that some Russian LNG entering France through the Dunkerque terminal is delivered to Germany.
Slovakia, the third-largest buyer within the EU, imported Russian fossil fuels worth EUR 165 mn. 61% of Slovakia’s imports were Russian crude oil via pipeline, valued at EUR 101 mn and the remaining portion of fossil fuel was pipeline gas valued at EUR 63 mn. Russian crude oil is refined into oil products and re-exported to Czechia. This is being allowed to continue because Slovakia’s exemption from the ban on exporting oil products made from Russian crude, which ended in December 2024, has been extended until June 2025.
Spain was the fourth-highest importer within the EU, purchasing explicitly Russian LNG valued at EUR 161 mn.
Belgium exclusively imported LNG valued at EUR 153 mn.
Last month, Czechia ranked as the fifth-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels, importing crude oil valued at EUR 132 mn. However, after the exemption allowing certain Russian banks to access the US payment system for energy transactions expired, no Russian oil has been delivered to Czechia this month. Both Orlen — the sole refiner in Czechia — and the Czech government have stated they will not seek alternative payment methods and are committed to ending their reliance on Russian crude oil completely. The Czech government has not yet sought a formal end to the EU exemption yet.

How are oil prices changing?

In March, the average Urals spot price dropped by 6% while staying above the price cap, trading at USD 66.5 per barrel.
The monthly average price of Sokol blend of Russian crude oil also dropped by a similar 5% to USD 69.4 per barrel.
Russian oil prices dropped in conjunction with a global drop in oil prices. The benchmark Brent crude also suffered a 5% month-on-month decrease in March.

Despite the global shift in prices of oil, trends on discounts for Urals grade crude oil remained relatively stable. In March, the discount on Urals-grade crude oil increased by a mere 2% month-on-month to an average of USD 5.9 per barrel compared to Brent crude oil. In contrast, the discount on the Sokol blend narrowed by 18% to USD 3.1 per barrel.
Throughout this period, vessels owned or insured by G7+ countries continued to load Russian oil in all Russian port regions, where average exported crude oil prices remained above the price cap level. These cases call for further investigation by enforcement agencies into breaches of sanctions.

The growth of ‘shadow’ tankers reduces G7+ shipping industry’s leverage over Russia

Boosted by increased deliveries to Asian countries, Russia’s seaborne crude oil exports rose to their highest levels in the last six months. At the same time, seaborne exports in the first quarter of 2025 have been 10% lower than in the first quarter 2024.
There was a 13% month-on-month increase in the volumes transported via ‘shadow’ tankers (53% of total), but these volumes still remained 12% lower than January. At the same time, Russian oil transported via G7+ owned or insured vessels rose by 20% month-on-month.
This shift is indicative of the effect of US sanctions imposed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in January on 183 vessels.
The biggest effect of these vessel sanctions has been on Russian crude. In March, G7+ owned or insured vessels transported 29% of all Russian crude. The rest was transported on ‘shadow’ tankers.
The volumes of Russian crude transported on G7+ owned or insured vessels saw a 36% month-on-month increase and were double the volumes transported by such vessels in January. While there was a 21% increase in the volume of Russian crude transported on ‘shadow’ tankers in March, they still remained 4% lower than the volumes from January.

‘Shadow’ tankers pose significant risks to ecology & impact of sanctions

In March, 380 vessels exported Russian crude oil and oil products, of which 164 were ‘shadow’ tankers. Thirty-six percent of these ‘shadow’ tankers were at least 20 years old or older. The oldest tanker transporting Russian oil in March was more than 30 years old.
Older ‘shadow’ tankers transporting Russian oil and petroleum products across EU Member States’ exclusive economic zones, territorial waters, or maritime straits raise environmental and financial concerns due to their age, questionable maintenance records, and insurance coverage. Their insurance potentially lacks sufficient protection & indemnity (P&I) coverage to cover the cost in the event of an oil spill or other catastrophe. In the case of accidents, coastal countries may bear the financial brunt of the cleanup, not to mention the repercussions of damage to their marine ecology.
The cost of cleanup and compensation resulting from an oil spill from tankers with dubious insurance could amount to over EUR 1 bn for coastal country’s taxpayers.

In March an estimated EUR 119 mn in Russian oil underwent ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in EU waters every day. Sixty-two percent of these transfers were facilitated by tankers covered using G7+ insurance.

U.S. escalates pressure on Russia with tariffs and economic sanctions

In a series of escalating moves aimed at pressuring Russia to halt its aggression in Ukraine and enter peace negotiations, the U.S. has unveiled new legislative and executive measures that could reshape global energy markets.

In March 2025, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 14245, imposing a 25% tariff on all goods imported into the U.S. from countries that purchase Venezuelan oil. This move is seen as part of a broader strategy to economically isolate regimes supporting Venezuela’s government, with the aim of compelling nations to choose between engaging with such regimes or facing punitive tariffs. This policy might mirror the tactics being considered for Russia’s fossil fuel exports, with the USA threatening to introduce additional tariffs of up to 50% on Russian oil.

Simultaneously, a bipartisan bill was introduced in the United States Congress proposing a massive 500% ad-valorem tariff on Russian-origin fossil fuels and uranium. The bill is designed to make Russian energy products prohibitively expensive, potentially driving global buyers to seek alternatives. It would significantly impact Russia’s energy export revenues, further isolating the country from major markets.
However, both proposals face a number of challenges. Such steep tariffs could lead to substantial market disruptions and trigger evasive tactics by Russia and its trading partners. These include rerouting supply chains or altering records of the origin of fossil fuels to obscure their true origin, thereby complicating enforcement efforts. Additionally, the bill’s broad waiver authority, which grants President Trump the discretion to exempt certain countries or goods temporarily for national security reasons, could weaken the overall effectiveness of the sanctions.

While these measures align with the USA’s broader strategy of using economic leverage to achieve foreign policy objectives, they also raise concerns about market stability, enforcement difficulties, and the risk of retaliatory actions from affected countries.

How can Ukraine’s allies tighten the screws?

Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues have fallen since the sanctions were implemented, subsequently constricting Putin’s ability to fund the war. However, much more should be done to limit Russia’s export earnings and constrict the funding of the Kremlin’s war chest. This includes lowering the oil price cap, increasing monitoring and enforcement of sanctions, and banning unsanctioned fossil fuels such as LNG and pipeline fuels that are legally allowed into the EU.

Lowering the oil price cap

A lower price cap of USD 30 per barrel (still well above Russia’s production cost, which averages USD 15 per barrel) would have slashed Russia’s oil export revenue by 40% (EUR 134 bn) from the start of the EU sanctions in December 2022 until the end of March 2025. In March alone, a USD 30 per barrel price cap would have slashed Russian revenues by 39% (EUR 4.74 bn).
CREA’s estimates of the impact of a revised and lowered price cap have been updated since February 2025. These numbers are a more accurate representation of the losses in revenue Russia would incur. Our earlier numbers severely underestimated the impact of a lower price cap, due to a bug that we identified which mislabelled commodities in our model.
Lowering the price cap would be deflationary, reducing Russia’s oil export prices and inducing more production from Russia to make up for the drop in revenue.
Since introducing sanctions until the end of March 2025, thorough enforcement of the price cap would have cut Russia’s export revenues by 11% (EUR 38.08 bn). In March 2025 alone, full enforcement of the price cap would have reduced revenues by 8% (approximately EUR 0.94 bn).

Restrict the growth of ‘shadow’ tankers & plug the refining loophole

Russia’s reliance on tankers owned or insured in G7+ countries has fallen due to the growth of ‘shadow’ tankers. This subsequently impacts the coalition’s leverage to lower the price cap and hit Russia’s oil export revenues. Sanctioning countries must prevent Russia’s growth in ‘shadow’ tankers that are immune to the oil price cap policy.
G7+ countries must also plug the widening refining loophole by banning the importation of oil products produced from Russian crude oil. This would enhance the impact of the sanctions by disincentivising third countries from importing large amounts of Russian crude and helping cut Russian export revenues. Banning the imports of oil products from refineries that process Russian crude oil would also lower the price of Russian oil, as they would struggle to find buyers or expand their market.

Stronger enforcement & monitoring

Enforcement agencies overseeing the sanctions must take proactive measures against violating entities, including insurers registered in price cap coalition countries, shippers, and vessel owners.
Despite clear evidence of violations, agencies must do more to enforce penalties against shippers, insurers, or vessel owners. This information must be shared widely in the public domain. Penalties against violating entities increase the perceived risk of being caught and serve as a deterrent.
Penalties for violating the price cap must be significantly harsher. Current penalties include a 90-day ban on vessels from securing maritime services after violating the price cap, a mere slap on the wrist. If found guilty of violating sanctions, vessels should be fined and banned in perpetuity.
Sanctions enforcement bodies must continue to sanction ‘shadow’ tankers as doing so hinders Russia’s ability to transport its oil above the price cap. CREA estimates that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)’s initial sanctioning of ‘shadow’ tankers widened the discount that Russia offered buyers of its oil and cut Russia’s crude oil export revenues by 5% (EUR 512 mn per month).
The lack of proper monitoring and enforcement along with rising oil prices have increased Russia’s export revenues to fund its war against Ukraine.
The G7+ countries should ban STS transfers of Russian oil in G7+ waters. STS transfers undertaken by old ‘shadow’ tankers with questionable maintenance records and insurance pose environmental and financial risks to coastal states and support Russia in logistically exporting high volumes of crude oil. Coastal states should require ‘shadow’ tankers transporting Russian oil through their territorial waters to provide documentation showing adequate maritime insurance. If ‘shadow’ tankers fail to do so, they should be added to the OFAC, UK, and European sanctions list. This policy could limit Russia’s ability to transport its oil on ‘shadow’ tankers, which are exempt from complying with the oil price cap policy.

Relevant reports:

Note on methodology:
Update 2023-10-19 – We now use Kpler to estimate seaborne exports from Russia and other countries. This change increases our tracker’s estimate of exports from Russia to the world by EUR 77.8 bn (+18% increase) and the exports to the EU by EUR 12.4 bn (+2.8% increase).
We have also changed how we receive protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance information about ships to obtain data directly from known P&I providers and Equasis. This ensures we have recorded the correct start date for a ship’s insurance.
Find out more details on the changes in our methodology, which are explained in our article about the migration from automatic identification system (AIS) data providers to the Kpler dataset.

The data used for this monthly report is taken as a snapshot at the end of each month. The data provider revises and verifies data on trades and oil shipments throughout the month. We subsequently update this verified data each month to ensure accuracy. This might mean that figures for the previous month change in our updated subsequent monthly reports. For consistency, we do not amend the previous month’s report; instead, we treat the latest one as the most accurate data for revenues and volumes.

Calculating the impact of sanctions: We estimated the impact of the EU/G7 crude oil ban and price cap by estimating the price of Urals in the absence of the cap and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We do this by first calculating the average difference between the spot prices of Brent and Urals in the year before the invasion. This average difference is used to estimate an expected price of Urals based on the current value of Brent since the start of the price cap. We use this expected price of Urals and the current price of Urals, along with the volumes of Urals traded from Kpler, to estimate the difference in the total value of Russia’s exports.