Authors: Vaibhav Raghunandan and Petras Katinas

Russian fossil fuel revenues drop to lowest levels since invasion, despite a significant increase in revenues from coal

Key findings

In May, Russia’s monthly fossil fuel export revenues saw a 3% month-on-month drop to EUR 565 mn per day — the lowest since the invasion.
India’s imports of Russian coal surged by 34% month-on-month — an all time high , totalling 3.74 mn tonnes (EUR 686 mn).
In May 2025, Russian seaborne oil exports fell by 7% month-on-month and almost half (54%) of these exports were transported on G7+ tankers. Since January, the G7+ share in this transport has increased from 35% to 54%, while the share of ‘shadow’ tankers fell from 65% to 46%.
Seaborne crude oil exports dropped by 3% month-on-month. G7+ tankers handled 39% of crude oil shipments in May, up from just 19% in January. ‘Shadow’ tanker use for crude fell from 81% in January to 61% in May.
In May, an estimated EUR 142 mn worth of Russian oil was transferred daily via ship-to-ship (STS) operations in EU waters — a 55% increase from the previous month. G7+ tankers conducted 93% of these transfers, while only 7% involved ‘shadow’ vessels.
In a recent statement, the President of the EU Commission proposed lowering the oil price cap to USD 45 per barrel, considering current global oil prices. CREA analysis suggests that a USD 45 per barrel price cap would have cut Russian revenues by 27% (EUR 2.8 bn) in May alone. But this calculation is based on strong and full enforcement of the cap — which even now leaves much to be desired.
CREA continues to advocate for a lower price cap of USD 30 per barrel which would have slashed Russia’s oil export revenue by 40% from the start of the sanctions in December 2022 until the end of May 2025. In May alone, a USD 30 per barrel price cap would have slashed Russian revenues by 36% (EUR 3.8 bn).

Trends in total export revenue

In May, Russia’s monthly fossil fuel export revenues saw a 3% month-on-month drop to EUR 565 mn per day — the lowest since the invasion. The drops in revenue occurred despite a 4% month-on-month increase in their export volumes.
Revenues from seaborne crude oil decreased by 8% month-on-month to EUR 176 mn per day — the lowest since January 2024. Meanwhile, their export volumes also dropped by 3% in May.
Russian revenues from crude oil via pipeline remained dropped by 8% month-on-month to EUR 59 mn per day, even as volumes remained stable.
Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) revenues remained stable at EUR 40 mn per day, and volumes surged by 7%.
Revenues from pipeline gas decreased by 7% to EUR 51 mn per day, and the volume of pipeline gas exports also dropped by 3%.
While there was no change in revenues from seaborne oil products (EUR 164 mn per day) in May, volumes surged by 11%.
Russian revenues from coal exports increased for a second straight month, rising by a massive 18% to EUR 74 mn per day — the highest levels since June 2024.

Who is buying Russia’s fossil fuels?

Coal: From 5 December 2022 until the end of May 2025, China purchased 44% of all of Russia’s coal exports. India (19%), Turkiye (11%), South Korea (9%), and Taiwan (4%) round off the top five buyers list.
Crude oil: China has bought 47% of Russia’s crude exports, followed by India (38%), the EU (6%), and Turkiye (6%).
Oil products: Turkiye, the largest buyer, has purchased 26% of Russia’s oil product exports, followed by China (13%) and Brazil (12%).
LNG: The EU was the largest buyer, purchasing 50% of Russia’s LNG exports, followed by China (21%) and Japan (18%).
Pipeline gas: The EU was the largest buyer, purchasing 37% of Russia’s pipeline gas, followed by China (30%) and Turkiye (27%).

China remained the largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels in May. Their imports accounted for 42% (EUR 5.7 bn) of Russia’s monthly export earnings from the top five importers. Crude oil comprised 57% (EUR 3.3 bn) of China’s imports from Russia.
China’s imports of seaborne Russian crude dropped by 11% month-on-month corresponding with a 5% drop in total imports of the commodity. In May, the share of Russian crude in China’s total imports remained stable at 12%.
While China’s global imports of coal rose by 6% in May, coal imports from Russia doubled in the month, totalling 6.6 mn tonnes (EUR 1 bn). Russia’s share in China’s total imports also grew by seven percentile points to 23% in May.
In May, India remained the second-largest purchaser of Russian fossil fuels, importing fossil fuels worth EUR 4.2 bn. Crude oil accounted for 72% (EUR 3 bn) of these imports.
India’s global imports of crude oil saw a 3% increase in May but Russian volumes remained stable at 7.9 mn tonnes. India’s crude imports from Russia over the last three months have been their highest import volumes since July 2024.
Russia remained the biggest crude supplier to India, maintaining a 38% share in their total imports. After a huge surge in Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) imports in April, the volumes of the grade dropped by 14% month-on-month.
India’s imports of Russian coal surged by 34% month-on-month to an all time high in May, totalling 3.74 mn tonnes (EUR 686 mn). While India’s global coal imports in May jumped to the highest levels since June 2022, Russian coal’s share rose by three percentile points to 15% in May.
A reduction in Russian crude exports in May can be attributed to lower crude production in the month. In May, Russia’s crude production volumes were marginally lower than the OPEC+ target for the month, even after compensating for overproduction in the past.
Turkiye was Russia’s third-largest importer of fossil fuels, contributing 13% (EUR 1.8 bn) of the total export earnings from its top five importers.
Over half (63% totalling EUR 1.1 bn) of Turkiye’s imports from Russia consisted of oil products. Their imports of Russian oil products saw a sharp 21% month-on-month increase in May. This was equivalent to a 30% increase in total oil product imports. Russian oil products constituted 85% of Turkiye’s total imports of oil products in May, with 48% of those deliveries made to three ports, Marmara Ereglisi, Mersin, and Ceyhan.
The Ceyhan port’s imports rose by three-fold in May, with the shipments to the port delivered to the Toros Ceyhan terminal. The terminal has previously been suspected of re-exporting Russian oil products to the EU.
The EU was the fourth-largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels, with its imports accounting for 10% (EUR 1.3 bn) of the top five purchasers. Almost half of these imports were Russian LNG, valued at EUR 618 mn.
Brazil bought EUR 567 mn of Russian fossil fuels, of which 99% was oil products and the remainder was coal.

In May, the five largest EU importers of Russian fossil fuels paid a total of EUR 1 bn. The EU does not sanction natural gas, which accounts for over 70% of these imports and is mainly delivered by pipeline or as liquefied gas. The rest was mostly crude oil, which continues to flow to Hungary and Slovakia via the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline under an EU exemption.
Hungary was the largest importer, purchasing EUR 336 mn of Russian fossil fuels in May. These included crude oil (EUR 109 mn) and gas via pipeline (EUR 226 mn).
Slovakia was the second-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels within the EU. Almost 80% of Slovakia’s imports consisted of crude oil via the Druzhba, valued at EUR 178 mn. Russian crude oil is refined into oil products and re-exported to Czechia, allowed under a derogation that was extended until June 2025.
CREA & CSD’s recently published report highlighted how Hungary and Slovakia have exploited this derogation and not reduced reliance on Russian fossil fuels since the invasion. A week after its publication, Hungary’s oil and gas major MOL Group announced a new agreement that could ‘increase the volume of alternative crude oil processed in its refineries by up to 160 thousand tonnes per year’. While masquerading as progress, in reality, this move would reduce both countries’ overall Russian oil reliance by a mere 1%.
Belgium was the third-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels in May, with their purchases totaling EUR 195 mn. The entirety of their imports consisted of Russian LNG.
France, the fourth-largest buyer within the EU, imported Russian fossil fuels worth EUR 164 mn, all of which was LNG. However, the fact that this gas is imported via France does not necessarily mean it is consumed there. A recent study indicates that some Russian LNG entering France through the Dunkerque terminal is delivered to Germany.
Spain exclusively imported LNG valued at EUR 161 mn from Russia in May.

How are oil prices changing?

In May, the average Urals spot price dropped by 5% below the price cap, trading at USD 57.3 per barrel.
The monthly average price of Sokol blend of Russian crude oil also dropped by a similar 6% to USD 59.4 per barrel.
Russian oil prices dropped in conjunction with a global drop in oil prices. The benchmark Brent crude also suffered a 3% month-on-month decrease in May.

In May, the discount on Urals-grade crude oil increased by a significant 15% month-on-month to an average of USD 6.3 per barrel compared to Brent crude oil. The discount on the Sokol, meanwhile, doubled to USD 4.1 per barrel.
Throughout this period, vessels owned or insured by G7+ countries continued to load Russian oil in all Russian port regions, where average exported crude oil prices remained above the price cap level. These cases call for further investigation by enforcement agencies into breaches of sanctions.

G7+ tankers regaining hold on Russian oil after Western sanctions

In May 2025, Russia exported 23.7 mn tonnes of oil by sea — a 7% month-on-month decline. Almost half (54%) of these oil exports were transported on G7+ tankers, a 3 percentage point increase from April. Since January, the G7+ share in this transport has increased from 35% to 54%, while the share of ‘shadow’ tankers fell from 65% to 46%.
Seaborne crude oil exports dropped by 3% month-on-month. G7+ tankers handled 39% of crude oil shipments in May, up from just 19% in January. ‘Shadow’ tanker use for crude fell from 81% in January to 61% in May.
The transport of Russian oil products has generally been less reliant on ‘shadow’ tankers. In May, G7+ tankers accounted for 76% of oil product exports, up from 67% in January. Shadow tankers transported 24% of these volumes, down from 33% at the start of the year.
Since late 2024, Russian Urals crude has consistently traded below the USD 60 per barrel price cap. In May, Urals crude oil (free-on-board) at the port of Primorsk averaged USD 51.35 per bbl. The lower Urals price expanded the legal pathways for transporting Russian crude using Western shipping, insurance, and financial services.

‘Shadow’ tankers pose significant risks to ecology & impact of sanctions

In May, 397 vessels exported Russian crude oil and oil products, of which 142 were ‘shadow’ tankers. Twenty-nine percent of these ‘shadow’ tankers were at least 20 years or older.
Older ‘shadow’ tankers transporting Russian oil and petroleum products across EU Member States’ exclusive economic zones, territorial waters, or maritime straits raise environmental and financial concerns due to their age, questionable maintenance records, and insurance coverage. Their insurance potentially lacks sufficient protection & indemnity (P&I) coverage to cover the cost in the event of an oil spill or other catastrophe. In the event of accidents, coastal countries may bear the financial burden of cleanup, as well as the repercussions of damage to their marine ecosystems.
The cost of cleanup and compensation resulting from an oil spill from tankers with dubious insurance could amount to over EUR 1 bn for coastal country’s taxpayers.

In May, an estimated EUR 142 mn worth of Russian oil was transferred daily via ship-to-ship (STS) operations in EU waters — a 55% increase from the previous month. G7+ tankers conducted 93% of these transfers, while only 7% involved ‘shadow’ vessels, which are often uninsured or registered under flags of convenience.
This shift reflects growing pressure from Western sanctions and enforcement measures. The EU’s 16th and 17th sanctions packages ban port access for any vessel involved in unauthorized STS of Russian oil and require a 48-hour advance notice for planned STS in EU waters. These policies target risky operations and reduce opportunities for non-compliant activity.
Panama has also joined in tightening oversight. In May, its maritime authority mandated that Panama-flagged tankers—many of which belong to the shadow fleet—submit detailed STS plans 48 hours in advance. Combined, these international measures are pushing STS operations toward compliant, G7-aligned vessels.

How can Ukraine’s allies tighten the screws?

Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues have fallen since the sanctions were implemented, subsequently constricting Putin’s ability to fund the war. However, much more should be done to limit Russia’s export earnings and constrict the funding of the Kremlin’s war chest. This includes lowering the oil price cap, increasing monitoring and enforcement of sanctions, and banning unsanctioned fossil fuels such as LNG and pipeline fuels that are legally allowed into the EU.

Lowering the oil price cap

A lower price cap of USD 30 per barrel (still well above Russia’s production cost, which averages USD 15 per barrel) would have slashed Russia’s oil export revenue by 40% (EUR 142 bn) from the start of the EU sanctions in December 2022 until the end of May 2025. In May alone, a USD 30 per barrel price cap would have slashed Russian revenues by 36% (EUR 3.8 bn).
Lowering the price cap would be deflationary, reducing Russia’s oil export prices and inducing more production from Russia to make up for the drop in revenue.
Since introducing sanctions until the end of May 2025, thorough enforcement of the price cap would have cut Russia’s export revenues by 11% (EUR 39.01 bn). In May 2025 alone, full enforcement of the price cap would have reduced revenues by 4% (approximately EUR 0.47 bn).
In a recent statement the President of the EU Commission proposed lowering the oil price cap to USD 45 per barrel, considering current global oil prices. CREA analysis suggests that a USD 45 per barrel price cap would have cut Russian revenues by 27% (EUR 2.8 bn) in May alone. But this calculation is based on strong and full enforcement of the cap — which even now leaves much to be desired.

Restrict the growth of ‘shadow’ tankers & plug the refining loophole

Russia’s reliance on tankers owned or insured in G7+ countries has fallen due to the growth of ‘shadow’ tankers. This subsequently impacts the coalition’s leverage to lower the price cap and hit Russia’s oil export revenues. Sanctioning countries must prevent Russia’s growth in ‘shadow’ tankers that are immune to the oil price cap policy.
G7+ countries must also plug the widening refining loophole by banning the importation of oil products produced from Russian crude oil. This would enhance the impact of the sanctions by disincentivising third countries from importing large amounts of Russian crude and helping cut Russian export revenues. Banning the imports of oil products from refineries that process Russian crude oil would also lower the price of Russian oil, as they would struggle to find buyers or expand their market.

Stronger enforcement & monitoring

Enforcement agencies overseeing the sanctions must take proactive measures against violating entities, including insurers registered in price cap coalition countries, shippers, and vessel owners.
Despite clear evidence of violations, agencies must do more to enforce penalties against shippers, insurers, or vessel owners. This information must be shared widely in the public domain. Penalties against violating entities increase the perceived risk of being caught and serve as a deterrent.
Penalties for violating the price cap must be significantly harsher. Current penalties include a 90-day ban on vessels from securing maritime services after violating the price cap, a mere slap on the wrist. If found guilty of violating sanctions, vessels should be fined and banned in perpetuity.
Sanctions enforcement bodies must continue to sanction ‘shadow’ tankers as doing so hinders Russia’s ability to transport its oil above the price cap. CREA estimates that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)’s initial sanctioning of ‘shadow’ tankers widened the discount that Russia offered buyers of its oil and cut Russia’s crude oil export revenues by 5% (EUR 512 mn per month).
The lack of proper monitoring and enforcement along with rising oil prices have increased Russia’s export revenues to fund its war against Ukraine.
The G7+ countries should ban STS transfers of Russian oil in G7+ waters. STS transfers undertaken by old ‘shadow’ tankers with questionable maintenance records and insurance pose environmental and financial risks to coastal states and support Russia in logistically exporting high volumes of crude oil. Coastal states should require ‘shadow’ tankers transporting Russian oil through their territorial waters to provide documentation showing adequate maritime insurance. If ‘shadow’ tankers fail to do so, they should be added to the OFAC, UK, and European sanctions list. This policy could limit Russia’s ability to transport its oil on ‘shadow’ tankers, which are exempt from complying with the oil price cap policy.

Relevant reports:

Note on methodology:

This monthly report uses CREA’s fossil shipment tracker methodology.

The data used for this monthly report is taken as a snapshot at the end of each month. The data provider revises and verifies data on trades and oil shipments throughout the month. We subsequently update this verified data each month to ensure accuracy. This might mean that figures for the previous month change in our updated subsequent monthly reports. For consistency, we do not amend the previous month’s report; instead, we treat the latest one as the most accurate data for revenues and volumes.

Russia’s daily revenues for commodities used in this report are derived as an average, using CREA’s pricing methodology.

CREA’s estimates of the impact of a revised and lowered price cap have been updated since February 2025. These numbers are a more accurate representation of the revenue losses Russia would incur. Our earlier numbers severely underestimated the impact of a lower price cap due to a bug that we identified that mislabelled commodities in our model.