Authors: Vaibhav Raghunandan, Petras Katinas

Russian fossil fuel export revenues hit lowest levels since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine but Turkstream supplies to Europe grow by 7% year-on-year

Key findings

• In September 2025, Russia’s monthly fossil fuel export revenues saw a 4% month-on-month decline to EUR 546 million (mn) per day — the lowest they have been since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Russian budget’s revenues from oil & gas revenues also recorded a 26% year-on-year reduction in September. 
• In September, Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries and ports curtailed Russian oil product exports, which saw a steep 13% month-on-month decline. Export volumes suffered a similar 9% month-on-month decline.
• Turkiye’s imports of oil products from Russia saw a massive 27% month-on-month reduction in September — the lowest levels since November 2022.
• Russian gas supply via TurkStream to Europe saw a 7% year-on-year increase this year, with 13.8 billion cubic meters (bcm) delivered in the first three quarters of 2025.
• ‘Shadow’ tankers delivered 69% of Russian crude oil exports in September, a 6% month-on-month increase.
• In September, at least 18 Russian ‘shadow’ vessels used false flags while carrying Russian oil globally, and 14 of them traversed European waters while doing so. 
• A lower price cap of USD 30 per barrel would have slashed Russia’s oil export revenue by 40% from the start of the EU sanctions in December 2022 until the end of September 2025. In September alone, a USD 30 per barrel price cap would have slashed Russian revenues by 36%. 
• Full enforcement of the newly lowered USD 47.6 per barrel price cap would have reduced revenues by 17% (approximately EUR 1.53 bn), in September 2025 alone.

Trends in total export revenue

• In September, Russia’s monthly fossil fuel export revenues saw a 4% month-on-month decline to EUR 546 mn per day — the lowest they have been since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 
• Russian revenues in September 2025 are half of what they were in September 2022 — despite volumes witnessing a mere 5% decline, in this same comparison window.
• Seaborne crude oil revenues saw a marginal 1% month-on-month increase to EUR 173 mn per day, proportional to a 3% increase in the volumes exported month-on-month.
• Revenues from crude oil via pipeline marginally decreased by 2% month-on-month, to EUR 62 mn per day.
• Liquefied natural gas (LNG) revenues increased by a massive 27% to EUR 40.5 mn per day, corresponding to a 29% increase in exported volumes. 
• Pipeline gas revenues decreased by 4% to EUR 73 mn per day, and the volume exported dropped by 2% month-on-month.
• Revenues from exports of seaborne oil products saw a steep 13% month-on-month decline, at EUR 129 mn per day. Export volumes suffered a similar 9% month-on-month decline. These drops can be attributed to Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries and ports, which handle high volumes of exports.
• Coal revenues dropped by 13% month-on-month to EUR 68 mn per day, with exported volumes increasing by 14%. This is the first time Russia’s revenues from coal have dropped in the last six months. 

Who is buying Russia’s fossil fuels?

• Russia’s fossil fuel exports remain highly concentrated, with China dominating coal and crude oil purchases, Turkiye dominating purchases of oil products, and the EU still the largest buyer of LNG and pipeline gas — showing Moscow’s dependence on a narrow set of key customers.
• Coal: From 5 December 2022 until the end of September 2025, China purchased 43% of all of Russia’s coal exports. India (20%), Turkiye (11%), South Korea (10%), and Taiwan (4%) round off the top five buyers list. 
• Crude oil: China has bought 47% of Russia’s crude exports, followed by India (38%), Turkiye (6%) and the EU (6%). 
• Oil products: Turkiye, the largest buyer, has purchased 26% of Russia’s oil product exports, followed by China (12%) and Brazil (12%) and Singapore (8%). 
• LNG: The EU remains the largest buyer of Russian LNG, and has bought half of Russia’s total LNG exports, followed by China (22%) and Japan (18%). 
• Pipeline gas: The EU is the largest buyer, purchasing 35% of Russia’s pipeline gas, followed by China (30%) and Turkiye (29%). 

• In September 2025, China remained the largest global buyer of Russian fossil fuels, accounting for 42% (EUR 5.5 bn) of Russia’s export revenues from the top five importers. Crude oil constituted 59% (EUR 3.2 bn) of China’s purchases, followed by coal at 14% (EUR 784 mn), pipeline gas (12% valued at EUR 658 mn) and LNG (9% valued at EUR 487 mn).
• While China’s global imports of seaborne crude saw a significant 13% month-on-month decline in September — the lowest since February 2025 — Russian volumes witnessed a lower decline, by 3% month-on-month.
• China’s imports of Russian LNG surged by 37% month-on-month to their highest levels this year. This surge contrasted sharply to a 15% month-on-month reduction in global imports.
• India remained the second-largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels, importing a total of EUR 3.6 bn. Crude oil dominated India’s purchases at 77% (EUR 2.5 bn), followed by coal at 13% (EUR 452 mn) and oil products at 10% (EUR 344 mn).
• India’s imports of Russian crude saw a 9% month-on-month reduction to their lowest volumes since February, despite their total imports recording a marginal increase.
• The drop in Indian imports of Russian crude has been mainly led by a 38% month-on-month drop in state-owned refineries’ imports from Russia. Indian state-owned refineries’ Russian crude imports have dropped to the lowest levels since May 2022.
• Turkiye was the third-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels, accounting for 20% (EUR 2.6 bn) of Russia’s export revenues from its top five buyers. Pipeline gas constituted the largest share of Turkiye’s imports at 40% (EUR 1 bn), followed by oil products at 31% (EUR 831 mn). Crude oil (EUR 542 mn) and coal (EUR 225 mn) constituted the remainder of their imports.
• Turkiye’s imports of oil products from Russia saw a massive 27% month-on-month reduction in September — the lowest levels since November 2022. The drop has been magnified mainly by a 53% month-on-month drop in their imports of gasoil from Russia. 
• The months of August and September saw Turkiye receive its first deliveries of refined oil products from the Vadinar refinery in India. The Rosneft-owned refinery was sanctioned by the EU in the 19th sanctions package. The refinery’s deliveries of ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) to Turkiye are the first since July 2021. 
• The EU was the fourth-largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels, accounting for 8% (EUR 1 bn) of Russia’s export revenues from the top five importers. The majority of imports, 70% (EUR 743 mn), consisted of LNG and pipeline gas, followed by crude oil at 29% (EUR 311 mn).
• South Korea remained the fifth-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels in September. Almost two-thirds of their imports, valued at EUR 283 mn, consisted of coal, followed by LNG (EUR 87 mn) and oil products (EUR 73 mn). South Korea’s imports of Russian coal have risen over the last two months due to a rise in electricity consumption and the increased competitiveness of the prices of Russian coal in the global market. 

Russian gas to Europe in the first nine months of 2025: LNG slumps, TurkStream rises

In 2025, Russian natural gas exports to Europe remain limited but resilient, totaling around 28 billion cubic meters (bcm) during the first nine months of the year — a 5% decrease compared to 2024. With the halt of Ukrainian transit, two routes dominate: liquefied natural gas (LNG) and the TurkStream pipeline. Despite the overall decline, Russia has managed to maintain a steady flow of gas to Europe, mainly to southern and southeastern markets, even as the EU intensifies efforts to phase out Russian fossil fuels. LNG exports to the EU now account for just over half of Russian deliveries, approximately 14.5 bcm in 2025, marking a 14% year-on-year decline. Shipments from Yamal continue to reach ports in Spain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece, but growing political pressure and discussions around an EU-wide ban on Russian LNG transshipments are tightening the space for this trade.  By contrast, TurkStream has strengthened its role as Russia’s only operational gas pipeline to Europe, delivering 13.8 bcm — a 7% increase from 2024. The pipeline primarily supplies Hungary, Serbia, and other Balkan countries, where dependence on Russian gas remains high. This regional reliance contrasts with Western Europe’s shift toward diversification, highlighting the uneven pace of Europe’s energy decoupling from Moscow.

• In September 2025, the five largest EU importers of Russian fossil fuels paid Russia a combined EUR 906 mn for fossil fuels. Natural gas — unsanctioned by the EU — accounted for two-thirds of these imports, delivered mainly by pipeline or as liquefied natural gas (LNG). The remainder was largely crude oil, which continues to flow to Hungary and Slovakia through the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline under an EU exemption.
• Hungary was the EU’s largest importer, purchasing EUR 393 mn worth of Russian fossil fuels. This included EUR 166 mn of crude oil and EUR 226 mn of pipeline gas.
• Slovakia was the second highest importer, with imports totaling EUR 207 mn. Crude oil delivered via the Druzhba pipeline made up 70% of the total (EUR 145 mn), while pipeline gas accounted for EUR 62 mn. The derogation allowing Slovak refineries to process Russian crude into oil products and re-export them to Czechia expired on 5 June.
• France was the third-largest buyer, importing EUR 153 mn of Russian fossil fuels, all in the form of LNG. However, not all of this gas is consumed domestically — a study shows that some LNG entering through the Dunkerque terminal is subsequently delivered to Germany. 
• Belgium was the fourth biggest importer, importing EUR 92 mn of Russian LNG, while the Netherlands, in fifth place, purchased EUR 62 mn, also entirely in LNG. 

How are oil prices changing?

• In September 2025, the average price of Russia’s Urals grade crude dropped by 2%, and was trading at USD 62.3 per barrel.

• In September, the discount on Urals crude increased by a massive 39% month-on-month, averaging USD 5.13 per barrel against Brent. This discount may also have been impacted by the implementation of the agreed lower price cap level of USD 47.6 per barrel. The lower cap implemented by the EU, UK, Canada, Norway, Switzerland and Australia came into force on 3 September.

G7+ tankers regaining hold on Russian oil after Western sanctions

• In September 2025, Russia exported 25 mn tonnes of oil by sea. Just under half (49%) of these shipments were carried on G7+ tankers, a 5 percentage point decline from August — suggesting a resurgence of oil transport on the ‘shadow’ fleet.
• G7+ tankers carried 31% of Russian crude oil exports in September, while the share of ‘shadow’ tankers rose by 6% month-on-month to 69%. Oil products, by contrast, remain less dependent on ‘shadow’ vessels, with G7+ tankers transporting 82% of shipments — a four percentage point increase month-on-month.
• In September, at least 18 Russian shadow vessels flew false flags while carrying Russian oil globally. These vessels carried EUR  736 mn of Russian oil globally while doing so. 
• While one of them, the Boracay, was detained by France for using a false flag of Benin, at least six other tankers with false flags departed from Russia’s Baltic ports carrying EUR 303 mn of oil and continued their journey uninterrupted. A further seven  such tankers carried EUR 223 mn of oil from the Black Sea ports. These 14 falsely flagged tankers traversed European waters while carrying EUR 525 mn Russian oil globally. 

‘Shadow’ tankers pose significant risks to ecology & impact of sanctions

• In September 2025, 338 vessels exported Russian crude oil and oil products, of which 112 were ‘shadow’ tankers. Fifty ‘shadow’ tankers were at least 20 years or older.
• Older ‘shadow’ tankers transporting Russian oil and petroleum products across EU Member States’ exclusive economic zones, territorial waters, or maritime straits raise environmental and financial concerns due to their age, questionable maintenance records, and insurance coverage. Their insurance potentially lacks sufficient protection & indemnity (P&I) coverage to cover the cost in the event of an oil spill or other catastrophe. In the event of accidents, coastal countries may bear the financial burden of cleanup, as well as the repercussions of damage to their marine ecosystems.
• The cost of cleanup and compensation resulting from an oil spill from tankers with dubious insurance could amount to over EUR 1 bn for coastal country’s taxpayers. 

• In September 2025, an estimated EUR 91 mn worth of Russian oil was transferred daily via ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in EU waters — a 44% decrease from the previous month. G7+ tankers conducted 96% of these transfers, while the rest involved ‘shadow’ vessels, which are often uninsured or registered under flags of convenience.

How can Ukraine’s allies tighten the screws?

Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues have fallen since the sanctions were implemented, subsequently constricting Putin’s ability to fund the war. However, much more should be done to limit Russia’s export earnings and constrict the funding of the Kremlin’s war chest. This includes lowering the oil price cap for crude and oil products, increasing monitoring and enforcement of sanctions, and banning unsanctioned fossil fuels such as LNG and pipeline fuels that are legally allowed into the EU. 

Lowering the oil price cap

• Since 3 September 2025, there have been two different levels of the price cap implemented on Russian crude oil. The EU, UK, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and Australia have implemented a USD 47.6 per barrel price cap on Russian crude. The US,  meanwhile, still follows the USD 60 per barrel cap. The cap on refined oil products remains unaffected by this divide. Since a larger set of the original price-cap coalition is now adhering to the lowered cap, CREA is now modelling the effect of full enforcement of it. 
• A lower price cap of USD 30 per barrel (still well above Russia’s production cost, which averages USD 15 per barrel) would have slashed Russia’s oil export revenue by 40% (EUR 156 bn) from the start of the EU sanctions in December 2022 until the end of September 2025. In September alone, a USD 30 per barrel price cap would have slashed Russian revenues by 36% (EUR 3.29 bn). 
• Lowering the price cap would be deflationary, reducing Russia’s oil export prices and inducing more production from Russia to make up for the drop in revenue.
• In September 2025 alone, full enforcement of the USD 47.6 per barrel price cap would have reduced revenues by 17% (approximately EUR 1.53 bn).

Restrict the growth of ‘shadow’ tankers & tighten regulations targeting the refining loophole

• Frequent sanctioning of Russian ‘shadow’ vessels has shifted Russian oil back to tankers owned or insured in G7+ countries. Nonetheless, Russian ‘shadow’ tankers still hold sway on the transport of Russian crude oil. In addition, many sanctioned vessels continue to deliver oil to ports globally, with EU and UK sanctions in particular, frequently violated. Sanctioning countries must align their vessel lists and enforcement paradigms for a magnified effect on their operations.
• Maritime coastal states should intensify efforts to monitor, inspect, and detain ‘shadow’ fleet vessels that lack legal passage rights, such as those unflagged, unlawfully idle, or posing security risks. Authorities must enforce and improve environmental and navigation laws within their territorial waters, investigating and boarding suspicious vessels when justified. Crews involved in criminal activity should face prosecution, with noncompliant ships and personnel subject to international arrest warrants. 
• In its 18th sanctions package, the EU has banned the imports of ‘oil refined from Russian crude’. The regulation bans imports from countries that are ‘net importers’ of crude oil. Net export status does not preclude the import and refining of Russian-origin crude, especially in jurisdictions with flexible or opaque crude sourcing practices. To close this enforcement gap, the exemption should be applied at the refinery level, not the national level. Refined petroleum products should be subject to import restrictions if produced at facilities that have processed Russian crude within the past six months, regardless of the final product’s declared origin or the host country’s net export position.
• The current grace period provides Russia as well as traders buying oil refined using Russian crude with excessive time to adjust supply chains and maintain oil revenue. A shorter 60-day wind‑down period, focused on high‑risk refined products like diesel and jet fuel, would reduce Russia’s fiscal gains and limit circumvention opportunities. It would also give the EU sufficient time to secure alternative suppliers.
• The exemption of countries including the UK, US, Canada, Norway, and Switzerland creates an opportunity for oil products refined from Russian crude to be re-exported to the EU. This gap should be closed to ensure the sanctions are comprehensive and watertight. The EU should work with its partners to encourage them to also ban the importation of oil products from refineries running on Russian crude.

Stronger enforcement & monitoring of the price cap

• Despite clear evidence of violations, there is a need for stronger enforcement of penalties by agencies against shippers, insurers, and vessel owners. This information must be shared widely in the public domain. Penalties against violating entities increase the perceived risk of being caught and serve as a deterrent.
• Penalties for violating the price cap must be significantly harsher. Current penalties include a 90-day ban on vessels from securing maritime services after violating the price cap, a relatively minor sanction. If found guilty of violating sanctions, vessels should be fined and banned in perpetuity.
• The G7+ countries should ban STS transfers of Russian oil in G7+ waters. STS transfers undertaken by old ‘shadow’ tankers with questionable maintenance records and insurance pose environmental and financial risks to coastal states and support Russia logistically in exporting high volumes of crude oil. Coastal states should require oil tankers suspected of being ‘shadow’ tankers transporting Russian oil through their territorial waters to provide documentation showing adequate maritime insurance. Upon failing to do so, having been identified as a ‘shadow’ tanker, they should be added to the OFAC, UK, and European sanctions list. This policy could limit Russia’s ability to transport its oil on ‘shadow’ tankers, which are not required to comply with the oil price cap policy. 
• To strengthen the integrity of maritime operations, it is imperative that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) revises its guidelines to enhance transparency regarding maritime insurance. The IMO should mandate that flag states require shipowners and insurers to publicly disclose key financial information, including insurer solvency data, credit ratings from recognized agencies, and audited financial statements. Maritime authorities of coastal states should be legally able and encouraged to detain tankers that fly false flags which therefore pose environmental and security threats.
  

Relevant reports:

• Dangerous dependence: Taiwan becomes world’s largest importer of Russian naphtha as coal imports persist
• How Ukraine’s European allies fuel Russia’s war economy
• Russia’s blacklisted tankers keep dumping oil in Europe’s seas
• Adani ban on sanctioned ships to impact India crude arrivals

Note on methodology: This monthly report uses CREA’s fossil shipment tracker methodology. The data used for this monthly report is taken as a snapshot at the end of each month. The data provider revises and verifies data on trades and oil shipments throughout the month. We subsequently update this verified data each month to ensure accuracy. This might mean that figures for the previous month change in our updated subsequent monthly reports. For consistency, we do not amend the previous month’s report; instead, we treat the latest one as the most accurate data for revenues and volumes. Russia’s daily revenues for commodities used in this report are derived as an average, using CREA’s pricing methodology.  CREA’s estimates of the impact of a revised and lowered price cap have been updated since February 2025. These numbers are a more accurate representation of the revenue losses Russia would incur. Our earlier numbers severely underestimated the impact of a lower price cap due to a bug that we identified that mislabelled commodities in our model.