Russia’s oil product exports hit an all-time low; meanwhile, India records its highest level of imported Russian crude ever

Authors: Luke Wickenden and Isaac Levi; Data scientist: Panda Rushwood

Key findings

In July 2026, Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues fell by 12% month-on-month to EUR 683 mn per day, even as export volumes remained flat.
Russia’s crude oil export revenues were broadly flat, up 1% month-on-month to EUR 392 mn per day. However, this masks a 21% fall in pipeline crude export earnings, offset by a 7% rise in seaborne crude export revenues.
In July, Russian oil product export loadings fell 23% to 4.7 mn tonnes, their lowest level on record and less than half the 9.6 mn tonnes loaded in July 2025. Tuapse, under sustained drone attack since May, loaded almost no oil products for a second consecutive month.
Russia’s LNG export revenues fell sharply by 36% month-on-month, while Belgium sourced all of its LNG imports in July from Russia.
India’s imports of Russian crude oil reached a record high for the second consecutive month in July 2026, rising by 2.1% month-on-month and valued at EUR 5.5 bn.
Despite the EU’s ban on oil products made from Russian crude, 18 shipments from refineries processing Russian crude were unloaded at EU ports in July—more than double the previous month’s total.
Refineries in India, Turkiye, Brunei, and Georgia that use Russian crude exported EUR 633 mn of oil products to sanctioning countries in July 2026.
Russian LNG imports to France, Spain and Belgium fell by a combined 46% month-on-month. Meanwhile, Russia supplied 100% of Belgium’s LNG imports in July.
In July 2026, 53% of Russia’s seaborne oil was transported by ‘shadow’ tankers under sanctions. A further 42% of the volume was transported by G7+ tankers. The remainder was transported by non-sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers.
In July, seven new vessels entered the Russian oil trade; only two of these tankers were owned or insured by the G7+ at the time of loading.
In July 2026, 46 ‘shadow’ vessels transporting Russian fossil fuels were operating under false flags at the end of the month.
The EU exemption in the 21st sanctions package will allow Greece’s Dynagas to redirect up to 7.4 mn tonnes of Russian LNG to third countries after the January 2027 import ban—roughly four times the EU-carried trade in 2025 (valued around EUR 1 bn).

Trends in total export revenues

In July 2026, Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues fell by 12% month-on-month to EUR 683 mn per day, even as export volumes remained flat.
Russia’s crude oil export revenues were broadly flat, up 1% month-on-month to EUR 392 mn per day. However, this masks a 21% fall in pipeline crude export earnings, offset by a 7% rise in seaborne crude export revenues.
Revenue from seaborne oil product exports unloaded at their destination ports fell sharply by 45% month-on-month to EUR 116 mn per day, while volumes fell 36%.
Oil product loadings at Russian ports had already fallen 21% month-on-month in June, and the drop in loaded cargoes resulted in lower oil product volumes delivered in July. In July, loadings then fell a further 23% to 4.7 mn tonnes, their lowest level on record and less than half the 9.6 mn tonnes loaded in July last year. Tuapse, under sustained drone attack since May, loaded almost no oil products for a second consecutive month. With refinery throughput still depressed and domestic demand taking priority (jet fuel, diesel, and gasoline are still under an export ban), the continued slide in loadings points to another fall in oil product revenues in August.
Following Ukraine’s 19 July drone strike on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s marine terminal near Novorossiysk, only one oil shipment was loaded between 22 and 26 July, while total monthly loadings at the Russian port dropped 23% month-on-month.
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) export revenues decreased sharply by 36% to EUR 38 mn per day while export volumes were down a similar 34% month-on-month. Loaded Russian LNG volumes still remained 8% higher than in July 2026.
Pipeline gas export revenues rose by 27% to EUR 71 mn per day, while export volumes rose 20% month-on-month.
Coal export revenues rose by 15% month-on-month to EUR 66 mn per day.

Who is buying Russia’s fossil fuels?

Russia’s fossil fuel exports remain highly concentrated, with China dominating purchases of coal and crude oil, Turkiye leading purchases of oil products, and the EU remaining the largest buyer of LNG and pipeline gas — showing Moscow’s dependence on a narrow set of key customers.
Coal: From 5 December 2022 until the end of July 2026, China purchased 37% of all Russian coal exports. India (19%), Turkiye (15%), South Korea (12%), and Vietnam (4%) round out the top five buyers’ list.
Crude oil: China has bought 50% of Russia’s crude exports, followed by India (37%), Turkiye (5%), and the EU (5%).
Oil products: Turkiye, the largest buyer, has purchased 26% of Russia’s oil product exports, followed by China (12%), Brazil (11%), Singapore (8%) and Saudi Arabia (8%).
LNG: The EU remains the largest buyer of Russian LNG, accounting for almost half (49%) of Russia’s total LNG exports, followed by China (23%), Japan (18%), and South Korea (6%).
Pipeline gas: The EU is the largest buyer, purchasing 32% of Russia’s pipeline gas exports, followed by China (31%), and Turkiye (30%).

In July 2026, China remained the largest global buyer of Russian fossil fuels, accounting for 43% (EUR 7.7 bn) of Russia’s export revenues from the top five importers. Crude oil accounted for 70% (EUR 5.4 bn) of China’s purchases, followed by pipeline gas (EUR 837 mn), coal (EUR 690 mn), LNG (400 mn) and oil products (EUR 360 mn).
China’s unloadings of Russian seaborne crude rose by 28% month-on-month and were 16% higher than in July 2025. Russia’s share of China’s seaborne crude oil imports rose to 25%, up from 13% in July 2025. East Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) grade crude, which loads at Russia’s Pacific port of Nakhodka, accounted for the vast majority (74%) of the Russian crude unloaded in China in July, up from 62% in June. Unloadings of Sokol-grade crude, which loads at the port of De Kastri, fell 12%.
In July 2026, Rizhao drove much of the increase in China’s seaborne imports of Russian crude, receiving 57% more than in June—its highest monthly volume since at least March 2022. Imports through the Dongjiakou oil terminal rose by 67% month-on-month, with the two terminals together accounting for roughly half of all Russian crude unloaded in China.
India was the second-largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels in July 2026, importing a total of EUR 6.4 bn of Russian hydrocarbons. Crude oil constituted 87% of India’s purchases, totalling EUR 5.5 bn. Coal (EUR 512 mn) and oil products (EUR 341 mn) constituted the remainder of their monthly Russian imports.
India’s imports of Russian crude oil reached a record high for the second consecutive month in July 2026 (valued at EUR 5.5 bn), rising by 2.1% from June. The increase was driven by terminals other than the two largest, Jamnagar and Paradip. Imports rose by 58% at HMEL Mundra, 35% at IndianOil Vadinar SMPL and 37% at Mumbai, while volumes at Jamnagar were unchanged and those at Paradip fell by 22%.
Turkiye was the third-largest importer, purchasing EUR 1.8 bn of Russian hydrocarbons in July. Pipeline gas accounted for the largest share at 40% (EUR 731 mn), followed by oil products (EUR 640 mn), crude oil (EUR 281 mn), and finally coal (EUR 172 mn).
Turkiye’s imports of Russian oil products fell sharply in July, declining by 55% month-on-month in value and by 49% in volume. Meanwhile, the value of its Russian pipeline gas imports rose by 89% as volumes more than doubled, overtaking oil products as the largest component of Turkiye’s purchases from Russia. Coal fell 25%; meanwhile, crude oil imports were unchanged month-on-month.
The EU was the fourth-largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels, accounting for just over 8% (EUR 1.5 bn) of Russia’s export revenues from the top five importers in July.
Pipeline gas made up 38% of the EU’s imports (EUR 561 mn) and LNG 36% (EUR 526 mn). The remaining 26% consisted of crude oil transported through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia.
In July, the EU’s imports of Russian LNG fell 42% month-on-month in volume terms, leaving them 6% below their July 2025 level. EU LNG imports usually fall in the summer months as warmer weather lowers natural gas demand, but this year’s drop is the steepest since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.
Although LNG volumes fell year-on-year, the EU still paid Russia EUR 526 mn for LNG in July 2026, 8% more than in the same month last year and three months after the EU’s ban on short-term Russian LNG supply contracts took effect on 25 April 2026. Under the REPowerEU regulation, Russian LNG imports remain permissible if the underlying short-term supply contracts were concluded before 17 June 2025, so strict enforcement and transparency remain necessary to ensure the ban is not undermined by imports under legacy contracts.
Saudi Arabia was the fifth-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels in July, purchasing EUR 600 mn, which consisted almost entirely of oil products. The Jizan Refinery stopped taking Russian oil products altogether, having already cut its intake sharply in June, while the Jeddah South Power Plant doubled its imports to become the largest single recipient in July. Almost all of Saudi Arabia’s Russian oil product imports now go to power plants rather than refineries.

In July 2026, the five largest EU importers of Russian fossil fuels paid Russia a combined EUR 1.3 bn. Natural gas (pipeline and LNG) — partially sanctioned by the EU — accounted for 70% of the value of imports from the five largest buyers. The five largest EU importers purchased EUR 886 mn of Russian natural gas, comprising EUR 518 mn of pipeline gas and EUR 368 mn of LNG, alongside EUR 375 mn of crude oil through the Druzhba pipeline.
Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria received EUR 518 mn in pipeline gas via the Balkan Stream pipeline.
In July, Hungary was the EU’s largest buyer, importing EUR 486 mn of Russian fossil fuels, largely comprising pipeline gas (62%).
Slovakia rose to become the EU’s second-largest importer in July, purchasing EUR 299 mn of Russian fossil fuels, nearly two-thirds of it crude oil.
France, Spain, and Belgium recorded a combined 46% decline in Russian LNG imports, all supplied by Yamal. Although Yamal loaded 20 cargoes in both June and July, a larger share was shipped east in July rather than to Europe. The decline was unevenly distributed. France received four fewer cargoes and Spain three fewer, while Belgium received only one fewer. As a result, Belgium’s imports fell by just 20%, making it the EU’s third-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels. In July, 100% of Belgium’s LNG imports came from Russia.
In July 2026, France’s imports of Russian LNG decreased by 54% to EUR 161 mn.
In July 2026, Spain, which ranked third in June, recorded a 64% decline in Russian LNG imports, to EUR 77 million. This pushed Spain out of the five largest EU buyers.

Despite the EU’s ban on imports of oil products made from Russian crude, which came into force on 21 January 2026, eighteen shipments of oil products from refineries using Russian crude — identified as high risk according to EU guidance — were unloaded at EU ports in July. This was an increase from eight shipments in June.
Eight of these shipments departed from Turkiye’s refineries, while five departed from Indian refineries and another five from Georgia.
In July, Spain and Cyprus unloaded seven shipments each from refineries running partially on Russian crude. Meanwhile, Croatia, France, Greece, Italy, Malta and the Netherlands also unloaded shipments from these refineries in July.
Enforcement agencies in Member States must investigate shipments of oil products imported from refineries that run on Russian crude to prevent Russian oil molecules from entering the bloc, which would violate the EU’s recently implemented ban.
Refineries in India, Turkiye, Brunei, and Georgia that use Russian crude exported EUR 633 mn of oil products to sanctioning countries in July 2026. The importers included the EU (EUR 214 mn), Australia (EUR 184 mn), and the US (EUR 234 mn). An estimated EUR 284 mn of these products were refined from Russian crude.
There was a 31% month-on-month decrease in exports of oil products from these refineries reported as destined for ports in sanctioning countries.
Exports of oil products to Australia from refineries running on Russian crude dropped 57% in value terms month-on-month, while those headed to the US rose 75% month-on-month.
In July 2026, the UK did not unload any shipments of oil products from refineries running on Russian crude despite the UK Government’s exemption allowing imports of diesel and jet fuel refined from Russian crude oil into the UK until the license expires on 1 January 2027.
Exports to the US originated at the Jamnagar refinery in India, the SOCAR-owned STAR refinery in Turkiye, and the Kulevi refinery in Georgia. In the prior three months, 55% of the Tupras Izmit refinery’s crude oil feedstock and 35% of the Jamnagar refinery’s feedstock came from Russia.
The Kulevi refinery in Georgia continues to run solely on Russian crude and has not received a single shipment of non-Russian crude since opening operations in October 2025, while also exporting refined products to the EU after the ban came into force. The package introduces a transaction ban on Georgia’s Kulevi refinery for processing and trading Russian oil, which will take effect after a six-month wind-down period. The Georgian port of Kulevi has stated that it will no longer accept Russian oil as of August or September this year. CREA’s recently published analysis highlights how Kulevi and Batumi appear to be exporting oil products suspected of containing Russian molecules to sanctioning jurisdictions.

How are oil prices changing?

In July 2026, the average price of Russia’s Urals-grade crude fell by 3% month-on-month to USD 60.22 per barrel, still significantly higher than the EU and UK price cap of USD 44.1 per barrel, which took effect on 1 February 2026 and has been capped at the same level under the EU’s 21st sanctions package.
In mid-July 2026, global oil prices rose as renewed US–Iran hostilities — including attacks on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz — revived fears of a major supply disruption. July also saw a 19% decline in detected crossings by vessels transporting oil or LNG through the strait.

In July, the price discount of Urals-grade crude oil relative to the global benchmark Brent remained flat at 26%, or USD 21 per barrel.

Sanctioned tankers carry the majority of Russian crude despite G7+ sanctions

In July 2026, 53% of Russia’s seaborne oil was transported by ‘shadow’ tankers under sanctions. A further 42% of the volume was transported by G7+ tankers. The remainder was transported by non-sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers.
G7+ tankers transported 34% of Russian crude oil exports in July, while non-sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers accounted for 5% of the total. The largest share, 62%, was carried by sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers.
For oil products, Russia’s dependence on G7+ tankers is higher; these tankers transported 72% of Russian oil products in July. Sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers carried 20% of total Russian oil product volumes, while non-sanctioned ‘shadow’ tankers accounted for 7% of the volume.

In July 2026, seven new vessels entered the Russian oil trade, none of which had previously loaded Russian oil at any point since the start of our analysis period in 2020. This total is below the average (roughly 12 new vessels per month) over the past 12 months. Only two of those seven newly Russia-serving vessels were owned or insured by the G7+ at the time of loading.
Newly Russia-serving ‘shadow’ fleet vessels (no ownership or insurance registered in sanctioning countries) have remained low across 2026, with five new ‘shadow’ fleet vessels shifting to serve Russian routes in July.
In July 2026, five vessels transported Russian oil products for the first time since 2020, none of which were owned or insured in G7+ countries at the time of loading.
In July 2026, two tankers transported Russian crude oil for the first time since 2020; both were owned or insured in G7+ jurisdictions.

In July 2026, 46 ‘shadow’ vessels were operating under false flags at the end of the month. Six of these falsely flagged vessels (13%) appear to be idle, having not loaded any cargo in over a year.
The false flag counts in this edition are higher than previously published, and earlier months have been revised accordingly. The registry data underlying CREA’s tracking now records cases where a flag administration disowned a vessel’s registration while the vessel continued to claim the flag. These vessels previously appeared legitimately flagged until their next change of registry, so earlier editions undercounted the falsely flagged fleet. June 2026 has been revised from 45 to 48 vessels on this basis. The trend is unchanged by the revision, with the number of falsely flagged vessels declining at a similar rate on either basis.
Most of the newly recorded cases trace back to the Comoros registry’s efforts to reclaim control of its flag. In 2025, Comoros centralised the issuance of registration certificates, revoked the authority of the private agents that had been registering ships on its behalf, and began an assessment of which vessels legitimately fly its flag. In the course of the clean-up by the Comoros Government, around 60 tankers tracked in this analysis had their registrations declared fraudulent with effect from May 2025. These vessels remained on the repudiated Comorian flag for a median of four months before re-emerging on other registries, most commonly the Gambia and Oman, and roughly a quarter moved straight onto another false flag. Comoros attributes the fraudulent registrations to an individual linked to Intershipping Services, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based company sanctioned by the EU and UK in July 2025 for registering ‘shadow’ fleet vessels under the flags of Gabon and Comoros.
Of the 46 falsely flagged vessels, 14 (30%) have carried both Russian and Iranian oil, alternating between the two sanctioned trades. Eight falsely flagged vessels most recently loaded Iranian crude or products and one loaded Venezuelan crude oil, pointing to a shared ‘shadow’ infrastructure that services Russia, Iran, and Venezuela interchangeably.
A spell of inactivity rarely signals a return to legitimate trade. Of the false-flagged tankers that went idle for over a year and have since resumed loading oil, 17 of 29 came back still flying a false flag, most often switching to Iranian, Venezuelan, or Omani cargo instead of Russian oil. Time spent idle under a false flag tends to precede a return to transporting sanctioned oil rather than an exit from it.
Six vessels delivered EUR 210 mn of Russian crude oil and oil products while flying a false flag in July, down 41% month-on-month.
Two false-flagged vessels that loaded crude oil in July departed from Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea coast — the rest transported Russian oil from its Pacific sea ports. For the third consecutive month, no falsely flagged vessel loaded from a Baltic or Arctic port, and none transited EU waters.
In July 2026, no Russian ‘shadow’ tankers were reported to have been seized or detained, compared with three in June 2026. However, on 20 July 2026, Italian naval forces operating under the EU’s Operation IRINI temporarily stopped and boarded the sanctioned tanker South Star (IMO number 9263186) on suspicion that it was sailing under a false flag. The EU and UK sanctioned tanker was permitted to continue following the flag-verification inspection.

Greece’s carve-out lets EU ships carry four times as much Russian LNG to third countries as they did in 2025

After Greece initially blocked the EU’s 21st sanctions package to protect its shipping interests, the final text adopted on 23 July allows EU operators to keep carrying Russian LNG to non-EU buyers under long-term contracts concluded before 24 February 2022. The carve-out punches a hole in the planned exit from the Russian gas trade, which has otherwise already been written into law. Spot market purchases of Russian LNG ended this April as of the REPowerEU Regulation. Before the exemption was introduced, EU companies were from 1 January 2027 due to be barred not only from importing Russian LNG under long-term contracts, but also from transporting it to third countries. The exemption will not permit the EU to import Russian LNG under long-term contracts. However, it will allow EU-owned or EU-managed vessels to transport Russian LNG to third countries. This shipping capacity is vital to Russia’s LNG trade, which relies heavily on specialist European vessels.

The EU’s exemption runs to 25 July 2027 and then renews annually by default unless the Council actively decides to end it. Hungary and Slovakia won the same type of exemption in 2022, keeping Russian crude flowing through the Druzhba pipeline on the condition that they phase it out as soon as possible. Imports through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia rose instead, and more than three years on that carve-out still has no end date; ending it requires unanimity, essentially allowing Hungary or Slovakia to block the phase-out for however long either country wants.The Druzhba carve-out is nominally for two countries, but its profits flow to one company, MOL, which owns the only refineries in both nations. Similarly, the exemption in the EU’s 21st sanctions package allows any qualifying operator to transport Russian LNG, but, in practice, benefits only one carrier, Dynagas. In 2025, EU-owned or managed vessels carried 38% of the Russian LNG imported into the EU itself. EU operators delivered just under 2 mn tonnes of Russian LNG to third countries, worth about EUR 1 bn, and Dynagas moved 96% of this volume in 2025. Its five Arc7 ice-class carriers serve Russia’s Arctic Yamal LNG project under charter agreements reportedly extending to 2065.

Each operator’s exemption is capped at the volumes it shipped in 2025 under its pre-invasion contracts, irrespective of where those cargoes went. Dynagas shipped about 7.4 mn tonnes last year; three-quarters of the volume was delivered to EU terminals. Those EU deliveries lose their market access on 1 January 2027, when the EU’s import ban on Russian LNG takes effect. The exemption therefore authorises roughly four times the third-country trade that the EU operators carried in 2025. Therefore, the EU exemption will let the EU-bound volumes fully redirect to Asia. Yamal is about to lose almost its entire market, with 77% of its 2025 exports delivered into the EU, which rose to 95% in the first half of 2026.
Year-round exports from Russia’s Yamal LNG facility depend on 15 specialist Arc7 ice-class carriers, whose reinforced hulls enable them to navigate the Arctic’s thick winter ice. With 14 of these vessels Western-owned, their scarcity represents one of the strongest points of leverage over Russia’s LNG trade. Russia is working to eliminate this vulnerability by developing alternative shipping capacity. At least eight second-hand LNG carriers were bought into Russian service in the six months leading up to August 2026, taking the country’s ‘shadow’ LNG fleet up to around 25 ships, and the Zvezda ship yard has already delivered the first two carriers Russia has built for itself, with four more under construction. Six ice-class vessels ordered in South Korea are still blocked by sanctions, so the specific shortage that constrains Arctic loading has not been solved, but the leverage is worth less with every quarter the exemption runs.
The Greek shipping sector argues that banning EU carriage would shift the trade to non-EU operators. However, the exemption allows EU carriers to continue profiting from the trade while giving Russia more time to sustain its vulnerable LNG business and develop alternative shipping arrangements. If EU companies continue to transport Russian LNG under the exemption, policymakers could consider imposing a levy on the trade to reduce the profits of Russian LNG exporters.
Operators must report their 2025 transport volumes by 25 August. These filings will determine whether Dynagas’s time-charter agreements qualify for the exemption. If Dynagas is unable to transport Russian LNG to third countries, it may seek to sell the vessels. A Council decision due by 25 October will determine whether the package’s dormant ban on LNG tanker sales is activated. Without that ban, Dynagas’s five Arc7 carriers could be transferred or sold to their Chinese co-owners, placing them entirely beyond the EU’s reach.
Seapeak, an LNG carrier operator headquartered in Glasgow, carried 7.4 mn tonnes of Russian LNG in 2025, similar to Dynagas and equal to 22% of Russia’s LNG exports, managing six of the fifteen Arc7s in its fleet. The UK’s ban on maritime services for Russian LNG is due to take effect in January 2027. London should hold firm and avoid an EU-style exemption—a carve-out tailored to one company, routinely renewed, and large enough to keep the Russian LNG trade moving.

‘Shadow’ tankers pose significant risks to ecology and the impact of sanctions

In July 2026, 397 vessels exported Russian crude oil and oil products. Among them, 221 were G7+ owned or insured tankers, and the remaining 176 were ‘shadow’ tankers. Additionally, 49% (87 in total) of these ‘shadow’ tankers were at least 20 years old or older.
Older ‘shadow’ tankers transporting Russian oil through EU waters pose environmental and financial risks due to their age, poor maintenance, and inadequate protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance. In the event of an oil spill or accident, coastal states may face significant cleanup costs and damage to their marine ecosystems.
The cost of cleanup and compensation from an oil spill by tankers with dubious insurance could amount to over EUR 1 bn for taxpayers in coastal countries.

In July 2026, an estimated EUR 176 mn worth of Russian oil was transferred across five ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in EU waters.
All STS transfers of Russian oil in EU waters were conducted in Spanish (72%), Polish (14%), and Cypriot waters (14%). G7+ tankers carried 86% by value.
Daily transfers averaged EUR 5.7 mn in July 2026.

How can Ukraine’s allies tighten the screws?

Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues have fallen since the sanctions were implemented, subsequently constricting Putin’s ability to fund his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, much more should be done to limit Russia’s export earnings and constrain the funding of the Kremlin’s war chest.

Lower the oil price cap to a baseline that tightens Russian revenues

The oil price cap has failed to impose a durable constraint on Russian crude export earnings, working only briefly and selectively for Urals while leaving other grades and export channels largely unaffected. Urals prices have fallen below the former USD 60-per-barrel cap for merely short periods. The cap was lowered to USD 44.10 per barrel on 1 February 2026 and subsequently frozen at that level under the EU’s 21st sanctions package. Meanwhile, ESPO-grade crude has consistently traded above both price cap levels because of strong demand from China and other Pacific markets.

G7+ sanctions have focused on Russian revenues rather than on restricting Russian export volumes — aimed at keeping Russian barrels flowing in global markets and easing fears of supply constraints. Policies such as the price cap are mainly aimed at reducing the price at which Russia could sell their oil.

In January 2026, as Russian oil prices fell sharply due to market oversupply, the EU proposed a ban on maritime services that facilitate Russia’s crude oil exports. Subsequently, in April 2026, the EU adopted its 20th sanctions package, which includes the basis for a future maritime services ban on Russian crude oil and petroleum products; however, it will be implemented only if an agreement is reached with the G7 and the Price Cap Coalition members. The maritime services ban would have, for the first time, targeted Russian oil export volumes and aimed at shrinking the tanker capacity required to transport Russia’s oil globally.

A massive spike in oil prices following reduced flows of fossil fuel shipments through the Strait of Hormuz has prompted a rethink of this policy to avoid creating further supply crunches in global markets. Therefore, in the face of the current energy crisis of 2026, CREA recommends that the price cap coalition either fix the price cap policy to a base level that severely restricts Russian revenues or implement a value-based sanction, such as a tax or surcharge on the use of Western maritime services for transporting Russia’s fossil fuels. A tax imposed by sanctioning countries on the use of Western maritime services to transport Russian crude oil and petroleum products could leverage their influence over trade to reduce Russian exporters’ profits, make Russian oil less commercially attractive, and generate revenue that could be used to support Ukraine.

Note: CREA now uses an updated model based on the observed G7+ share of the tanker fleet transporting Russian crude and oil products. This replaces the previous fixed estimate of the lower price cap and tighter enforcement level, which overstated the G7+ share, and accounts for the revised results.

CREA recommends that the price cap for crude oil is set at a lower level of USD 30 per barrel — still well above Russia’s production cost, which averages USD 15 per barrel. A lower price cap level for both premium (modelled at USD 45 per barrel) and discounted oil products (USD 25 per barrel) is also recommended to constrain Russia’s export earnings. These price cap levels would have slashed Russia’s seaborne crude oil export revenue by 27% from the start of the EU sanctions in December 2022 until the end of July 2026.
In July alone, a fully enforced USD 30 per barrel price cap and lower product caps would have slashed Russian revenues by 40% (EUR 3.9 bn).
CREA recommends lowering the oil product price caps, which have remained unchanged since they were introduced in February 2023. With Western-owned or insured tankers now carrying a greater value of Russian oil products than crude oil, policymakers should not overlook their leverage over the transportation of these products.
Lowering the price cap would be deflationary, reducing Russia’s oil export prices and inducing more production from Russia to make up for the drop in revenue.

For the price cap policy to achieve its desired impact, strong enforcement is key. In July 2026, full enforcement of the USD 44.1 per barrel price cap and the two respective oil product price cap levels (USD 100 per barrel for premium to crude oil products and USD 45 per barrel for discount to crude oil products) would have reduced Russia’s oil export revenues by 17% (approximately EUR 2.2 bn) compared to zero compliance with the policy.
If 50% of Russian oil transported on G7+ tankers complied with the current price cap levels, Russia’s oil export revenues in July 2026 would have been approximately EUR 1.1 billion (8%) lower than under a scenario with no price-cap compliance.

Create better enforcement mechanisms for the price cap policy

Sanctioning countries must implement measures that address attestation fraud — a key enabler of non-compliance. Maritime insurers or vessel owners currently do not have direct access to pricing information for the oil they insure or transport and are reliant on attestation documents provided by oil traders for price cap compliance.
At the same time, the majority of Russian crude oil is traded by opaque entities located outside price cap coalition countries — such as the UAE and Hong Kong. These traders can fraudulently underreport the price that they paid to attain Western maritime services for the transport of Russian oil.
Maritime insurers and oil traders must be required to obtain a bank statement showing that the Russian oil was traded below the price cap to avoid fraudulent attestation documents being produced. This bank statement must be verified by the bank itself to reduce the risk of the oil trader fraudulently producing documents. It would also enable maritime service providers to independently verify the price paid for the oil.
As an alternative to amending and enforcing the price cap policy, sanctioning jurisdictions could utilise their leverage to tax Russia’s use of G7+ maritime services when transporting its fossil fuels.

Restrict the growth of ‘shadow’ tankers & tighten regulations targeting the refining loophole

Frequent sanctioning of Russian ‘shadow’ vessels has shifted Russian oil back to tankers owned or insured in G7+ countries. Nonetheless, Russian ‘shadow’ tankers still hold sway over the transport of Russian crude oil. In addition, many sanctioned vessels continue to deliver oil to ports globally, with EU and UK sanctions in particular being frequently violated. Sanctioning countries must align their vessel lists and enforcement paradigms for a magnified effect on their operations.
Maritime coastal states should intensify efforts to monitor, inspect, and detain ‘shadow’ fleet vessels that lack legal passage rights, such as unflagged, unlawfully idle, or security-risk vessels. Authorities must enforce and improve environmental and navigation laws within their territorial waters, investigating and boarding suspicious vessels when justified. Crews involved in criminal activity should face prosecution, and noncompliant ships and personnel should be subject to international arrest warrants.
In its 18th sanctions package, the EU banned the imports of ‘oil refined from Russian crude’. The regulation bans imports from countries that are ‘net importers’ of crude oil. Net export status does not preclude the import and refining of Russian-origin crude, especially in jurisdictions with flexible or opaque crude sourcing practices. To close this enforcement gap, the exemption should be applied at the refinery level rather than the national level. Refined petroleum products should be subject to import restrictions if produced at facilities that have processed Russian crude within the past six months, regardless of the final product’s declared origin or the host country’s net export position.
The exemptions for countries including the UK, the US, Canada, Norway, and Switzerland create an opportunity for oil products refined from Russian crude to be re-exported to the EU. This gap should be closed to ensure the sanctions are comprehensive and watertight. The EU should work with its partners to encourage them to also ban the importation of oil products from refineries running on Russian crude.
Imports of oil products or petrochemicals from storage terminals or re-export hubs in non-sanctioning countries that have received a shipment of Russian oil in the previous six months should be prohibited from exporting to sanctioning jurisdictions. This aims to prevent re-export hubs from obfuscating the origin of imported Russian oil products that are then sent to sanctioning countries, as seen in suspicious cases observed in Turkiye and Georgia.

Stronger sanctions enforcement and monitoring of violations

Despite clear evidence of violations, there is a need for stronger enforcement of penalties by agencies against shippers, insurers, and vessel owners. This information must be shared widely in the public domain. Penalties against violating entities increase the perceived risk of being caught and serve as a deterrent.
Penalties for violating the price cap must be significantly harsher. If found guilty of violating sanctions, vessels should be fined and permanently banned from accessing Western maritime services or entering ports in sanctioning jurisdictions.
The G7+ countries should ban STS transfers of Russian oil in their territorial waters. STS transfers undertaken by old ‘shadow’ tankers with questionable maintenance records and insurance pose environmental and financial risks to coastal states and support Russia logistically in exporting high volumes of crude oil. Coastal states should require oil tankers suspected of being ‘shadow’ tankers transporting Russian oil through their territorial waters to provide documentation showing adequate maritime insurance. If they fail to do so and are identified as a ‘shadow’ tanker, they should be added to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), UK, and European sanctions lists. This policy could limit Russia’s ability to transport its oil on ‘shadow’ tankers, which are not required to comply with the oil price cap policy.
To strengthen the integrity of maritime operations, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) must revise its guidelines to enhance transparency regarding maritime insurance. The IMO should mandate that flag states require shipowners and insurers to publicly disclose key financial information, including insurer solvency data, credit ratings from recognised agencies, and audited financial statements. Maritime authorities of coastal states should be legally able and encouraged to detain tankers that fly false flags and therefore pose environmental and security threats. The IMO should also promptly report tankers operating under false flags or with revoked registrations, improving transparency and enabling authorities to better track falsely flagged vessels.

Relevant reports:

Check out CREA’s live Russian Fossil Fuel Export Tracker and Russia Sanctions Tracker for the latest data on Russian fossil fuel exports and the impact of sanctions.

If you would like to obtain any of the data underlying these charts, please do not hesitate to contact us at queries-russia@energyandcleanair.org.

Note on methodology:

This monthly report uses CREA’s fossil shipment tracker methodology.
The data used for this monthly report is taken as a snapshot at the end of each month. The data provider revises and verifies data on trades and oil shipments throughout the month. We subsequently update this verified data each month to ensure accuracy. This might mean that figures for the previous month change in our updated subsequent monthly reports. For consistency, we do not amend the previous month’s report; instead, we treat the latest one as the most accurate data for revenues and volumes.
Russia’s daily revenues for commodities used in this report are derived as an average, using CREA’s pricing methodology.
The number of vessels with false flags per month is calculated using an end-of-month snapshot. In other words, for each month, vessels were counted if their most recent flag change at the end of the month was to a false flag.
This does not account for the vessels with multiple false flag periods (switches between false flags and verified flags, or between different false flags), only the most recent flag status at the end of the month.
To calculate the volume and value carried by false flags through EU waters, we filter for vessels that load from Russia’s northern and western ports (Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Vysotsk, St Petersburg, Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Kaliningrad) in the current month and check whether they have transited the Danish Straits, the English Channel or the Straits of Gibraltar.
We assume that falsely flagged vessels that have not transported a single cargo in the last two years are not operational and therefore exclude them from the analysis.
CREA’s estimates of the impact of a revised and lowered price cap have been updated since February 2025. These numbers are a more accurate representation of the revenue losses Russia would incur.